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Abstract 
 
Following the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Crawford v. Washington, tensions between the 
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause and evidence-based prosecution of intimate-partner 
violence increased. In consequence, the Court forged a path of Constitutional jurisprudence 
which has weakened the power of the Confrontation Clause, reverted to a disguised reliability 
test reminiscent of Ohio v. Roberts, and diminished the rights of the accused. Simultaneously, 
these rulings have created a hierarchy where the severity of private, domestic violence is 
regarded as a lower level of emergency than public violence. Consequently, the Supreme Court’s 
primary purpose test for testimonial statements should be replaced with a two-part test which 
analyzes both the purpose and function of out-of-court statements, and evidence-based 
prosecutions should be supported by policy solutions adopted at local and state levels. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Purpose 
A woman calls 911 and reports that her husband had beat her.  She relays her address to 
the dispatcher. The dispatcher asks for the name of the caller and the woman identifies herself as 
Maria. The dispatcher then asks if Maria’s husband is still present and Maria informs the 
operator that he left the house, drunk. The dispatcher asks Maria what had happened. Maria 
identifies her husband by name, Mike, and informs the dispatcher that her husband came home 
drunk and became angry with her—this had happened before. Maria explains that the fight 
escalated, she had been hit and pushed and received a serious head wound when she fell 
backward and slammed her head on the corner of the kitchen table. It was after this that her 
husband stormed out. The 911 operator asks if an ambulance was needed and Maria answers 
affirmatively. The dispatcher assures her that help is on the way and proceeds to ask Maria to 
describe Mike, the suspect. Maria tells the dispatcher the height, weight, race, and distinguishing 
characteristics of her husband, including a description of his clothing. The dispatcher asks how 
long-ago Maria’s husband left the house and where Maria believes he may have gone. Maria 
responds that it had been no more than five minutes; she had regained enough composure after 
her fall to be able to make the phone call. Maria was not sure where he may have gone. The 
dispatcher asks whether weapons were involved in the events Maria was describing, and Maria 
answers that Mike owned a gun and had threatened to use it before, but he had not specifically 
threatened her with it this time. She was not sure whether it was in its case or with him. Finally, 
the dispatcher asks Maria whether police had been at her address before, and if so, how many 
times and when the most recent time was. Maria answers that the police had been to her home 
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twice before, the most recent being approximately three weeks earlier. The dispatcher stays on 
the line with Maria until the police arrive at the scene.1 
 When the police and ambulance arrive at Maria’s home, Maria is examined by EMTs. 
Maria’s injuries, the disorderly kitchen scene, and the corner of the dining room table where 
small droplets of blood can be seen are photographed. EMTs ask Maria how she received her 
injuries and she describes being pushed down and hitting her head on the table and how she 
expected that bruises on her forearms were the result of being forcibly grabbed by her husband. 
The responding police secure the scene, ask Maria a series of questions similar to those asked 
during the 911 call, and commence a search for Maria’s husband after they receive a name 
identification and a description. The police find Mike and arrest him for domestic battery. Once 
the charges had been filed, a prosecutor contacts Maria to prepare testimony for Mike’s trial. 
Maria refuses to cooperate.   
Dynamics and Differences of Intimate-Partner Violence 
Intimate-partner violence is a tragic and pervasive issue that affects more than 10 million 
men and women in the United States per year.2 The Center for Disease Control has adopted the 
term “intimate-partner violence” in lieu of domestic violence in order to recognize that violence 
between intimate partners is not limited to the home or to legal conceptions of family.3 Maria’s 
                                                             
1 “Handling a Domestic Violence Call In-Service Training for Police Dispatchers.” Police Resources, 2003. 
www.njpdresources.org/dom-violence/dv-dispatcher-stud.pdf. 
The prior source was used to guide the creation of the hypothetical Maria and Mike scenario. The resource guide 
served as an example of dispatcher questions to be asked during a response to a domestic violence call. The source 
provided guidance for my choosing of questions for the scenario. 
** Intimate-partner violence is not limited to male-on-female violence. This violence impacts people of all sexes and 
impacts same-sex couples, as well. I recognize that IPV is nuanced and encompasses many diverse forms of 
relationships, however the language of this project will default to pronouns which suggest male-on-female violence. 
This choice was made not to suggest limitations on the scope of victims and relationships which IPV affects, but 
rather to allow for linguistic clarity and reflect the language used in the majority of sources I utilized. 
2 NCADV, National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, 2018. https://ncadv.org/statistics. 
3 National Domestic Violence Prosecution Best Practices Guide: White Paper, National District Attorneys Association, 
Women Prosecutors Section, Alexandria, VA: March 16, 2017. p6. 
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story, although an anecdotal fictional scenario, is not unlike many intimate-partner violence 
cases that come before courts. Maria had experienced prior abuse, violence escalated, the police 
become involved on multiple occasions, and before any prosecution begins, the woman recants 
or refuses to cooperate with prosecutors. The dynamics of intimate-partner violence differ from 
other crimes because the intimate relationship and shared life between the perpetrator and the 
victim creates a knot of complications that must be untangled or cut before the criminal justice 
system can operate effectively. Unlike other crime victims, battered women often cohabitate with 
their abusers, they may share children, feel emotionally attached, or depend on their abuser for 
financial support. Leaving an abusive partner, or choosing to involve oneself in a prosecution 
process against a batterer whether leaving or not, requires victims to decide whether moving 
forward with any action will make them safer and be beneficial, and whether they are capable of 
successfully embarking on the leaving process.4 Intimate-partner violence affects people of all 
social and economic classes, people from every level of education, and people from every corner 
of the world.5 Consequently, the determination of benefits and the feasibility of leaving requires 
a nuanced array of religious, cultural, economic, familial, and safety factors to be considered by 
every victim. As many as fifty percent of all homeless women became homeless as a 
consequence of leaving an abusive intimate partner.6 Intimate-partner violence and leaving such 
situations are often indicative of resulting poverty.7 Victims must consider the realities of more 
difficult financial circumstances, the dynamics of single parenting or possibilities of losing 
                                                             
4 Michael P. Johnson and Kathleen J. Ferraro, “Research on Domestic Violence in the 1990s: Making Distinctions,” 
Journal of Marriage and the Family 62(4);(2000): 948–63. 
5 Rakovec-Fesler, Zlatka, “Domestic Violence and Abuse in Intimate Relationship from Public Health Perspective,” 
Health Psychology Research, no. 2(3) (November 2014). https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4768593/. 
6 American Civil Liberties Union, “Domestic Violence and Homelessness,” American Civil Liberties Union: Women’s 
Rights Project, p.2-4. 
7 Johnson and Ferraro.  
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custody of children, and whether they will have access to bank accounts, assets, or a place to go 
to receive assistance.8 Intimate-partner violence victims with immigrant or refugee status must 
consider whether leaving or involving law enforcement will complicate their status; the fear of 
an abuser may be lesser than the fear or deportation.9 Leaving can be the most dangerous point in 
time for a battered woman. Abuse does not often end when the relationship does. Once a victim 
leaves, the perpetrator often continues measures of harassment, stalks the victim, violates 
restraining orders, or continues physical harm.10 One study demonstrated that seventy percent of 
intimate partner violence injuries were inflicted after the relationship had ended.11 The decision 
to leave is not simply a departure from a person—it is a departure from a lifestyle that the victim 
may feel is safer than a lifestyle of homelessness, economic struggle, and loneliness. 
 In addition to the material consequences of leaving, victims of intimate-partner violence 
are trapped within a dynamic of power and control which creates emotional and psychological 
consequences that victims must weigh against the benefits of leaving.  Intimate partner violence 
is accompanied by psychological effects on victims including posttraumatic stress disorder, 
depression, and a lacking sense of self-esteem.12 One study discovered that 63.8 percent of 
women victimized by intimate partners suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder.13 Often 
intimate-partner violence cases which are brought before courts are examples of “intimate 
terrorism” where an intimate partner practices general control over the victim.14 This form of 
violence often escalates, is often one-sided, and is more likely to result in serious injuries than 
                                                             
8 “Why Do Victims Stay?” accessed November 15, 2018, https://ncadv.org/why-do-victims-stay. 
9 Johnson and Ferraro. 
10 Rakovec-Fesler, Zlatka. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Johnson and Ferraro. 
13 Rakovec-Fesler, Zlatka. 
14 Johnson and Ferraro. 
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defensive or mutual violence.15 The effects of this form of violence affect other aspects of 
victims’ lives. The negative psychological effects harm both physical and mental health and 
result in victims more consistently missing work and becoming two-thirds as likely to be unable 
to hold employment for more than thirty hours per week for more than six months than non-
battered women.16 
Studies of abuse demonstrate that there are four stages which are cycled through that 
reinforce dynamics of power and control. The first stage is identifiable by the steady building of 
tension where the abuser becomes angry and the victim becomes increasingly more uneasy and 
apologetic in order to diffuse tension.17 During the second stage the abuser acts out and engages 
in behaviors which harm the victim.18 The third stage is identifiable as the “honeymoon phase” 
where the abuser apologizes and asks for forgiveness; the abuser makes promises and tries to 
shift blame to the victim or “gaslight” her about the severity of the abuse.19 Finally, during the 
fourth stage the relationship will be calm; the abuser may give gifts and act on promises and the 
victim may believe that the abuser has changed and the abuse is over.20 It is this cycle which 
creates complications in securing the testimony of victim-witnesses and contributes to the 
privatization of this crime. Victims are less likely to involve law enforcement when they do not 
consider their abuse to be criminal acts; the honeymoon phase and calm stage of the cycle of 
abuse create feelings where victims feel as though their relationship and the harm they endure is 
                                                             
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Rakovec-Fesler, Zlatka. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
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normal.21 Abusers make additional efforts to minimize the conceptions that the victim has about 
the severity of the abuse they face.  
In a study of jailhouse calls that abusers made to their intimate-partner victims the 
researchers discovered that abusers were utilizing minimization tactics, appeals to sympathy, and 
requests for recantation more than overt threats to coerce victims into backing out of 
prosecutions.22 A five-step process was identified within these phone calls. First, the victim is 
determined and strong and the abuser works to wear away these feelings of confidence.23 Second, 
the abuser makes an effort to convince the victim that she is overreacting and asks the victim 
whether she thinks that the abuser “deserves” the charges, the treatment in jail, or other 
repercussions; he minimizes the severity of the attack while inflating the severity of his 
punishment.24 The abuser often manages to frame the situation in a manner where he is the 
victim and elicits sympathy and care from the woman he abused—the situation flips and the 
battered woman is put in a place where her partner is seemingly in trouble and she must be the 
one to “save him.”25 Third, the abuser bonds with the victim and the couple takes on an “us 
against the world” mentality.26 Fourth, the abuser asks the victim to remove herself from the 
prosecution and recant, and fifth, the recantation plan and story are created.27 In most criminal 
prosecutions outside of the intimate-partner violence sphere there is not the same complexity of 
interaction between victim and perpetrator. If the victim is to be involved in a prosecution, the 
                                                             
21 “Reasons for Reporting and Not Reporting Domestic Violence to the Police - FELSON - 2002 - Criminology - Wiley 
Online Library,” accessed November 16, 2018, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1745-
9125.2002.tb00968.x. 
22 “Jailhouse Phone Calls Reveal Why Domestic Violence Victims Recant -- ScienceDaily,” accessed November 15, 
2018, https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/08/110815101535.htm. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
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prosecutorial system must often break the deep emotional, social, and economic bonds which 
exist between the batterer and the battered—this is no easy task. 
America’s adversarial legal system is set up as an awkward structure for intimate partner 
violence cases to exist within because the system expects that there is an adverse relationship 
between a victim and a perpetrator; however, intimate partner violence cases are not so black and 
white.28 This grey area of determining whether or not a batterer is an adversary contributes to 
high rates of uncooperative or recanting victims. In nearly eighty percent of all intimate-partner 
violence cases the woman recants or refuses to cooperate.29  Consequently, the courts face 
complications when working to prosecute batterers when there are non-cooperative witnesses.  
Evidence-Based Prosecution 
In response to the problem of recanting victims, many jurisdictions have adopted 
“victimless” or “evidence-based” prosecution policies as a means of better responding to 
intimate-partner violence (IPV). Duluth, Minnesota, San Diego, California, Los Angeles, 
California, and Nashville, Tennessee were the trailblazing cities for these policies and Duluth 
was the birthplace of a model used to understand the intricacies of intimate-partner violence 
which describes IPV as a manifestation of power and control. These policies are characterized by 
the prosecution of an alleged batterer without calling the victim to testify. Compulsory means of 
securing victim testimony such as subpoenas are not used to secure the victim’s presence and 
threats of jail-time and other legal consequences are not employed to encourage the victim to be 
available for trial. These policies allowed for the prosecution of an alleged batterer to continue 
without the direct and voluntary involvement of the victim. The goals of intimate-partner 
violence laws are to punish offenders, prevent future offenders, and empower and assist 
                                                             
28 Jones, Ann. Next Time, She'll Be Dead: Battering & How to Stop It. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2000. 
29 National Domestic Violence Prosecution Best Practices Guide.  
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victims.30 Evidence-based prosecution approaches these goals by leading to higher conviction 
rates and allowing victims to focus on personal needs and safety rather than upcoming trials, but 
do, quite literally, remove the voice of the victim from the trial. Evidence-based prosecutions 
utilize 911 call recordings, photos of the crime scene and victim, physical evidence such as 
ripped clothing, medical evaluation forms, expert testimony, statements of the accused, and even 
police body-camera footage to build a case against the defendant.31 The victim, however, will not 
be called to the witness stand to tell her story or be cross-examined. Maria’s example case would 
be a good candidate for an evidence-based prosecution. However, statements that Maria made 
out of court may violate the United States Constitution’s Sixth Amendment guarantee for the 
accused to confront the witnesses against him. This creates a significant tension between the 
Confrontation Clause and the successful prosecutions of batterers with evidence-based 
prosecution. If Maria does not appear in court but her statements that identified Mike as her 
abuser and connected his violent actions to her injuries are entered in to evidence, then Mike’s 
rights of confrontation may have been swept under the rug for the sake of bringing intimate-
partner violence out in the open. 
Evidence-Based Prosecution and Ohio v. Roberts 
Evidence-based prosecution policies were working well under the framework of Ohio v. 
Roberts (1980) which dictated the boundaries of the Confrontation Clause until 2004. Roberts 
allowed for hearsay statements to be admitted when a declarant is absent from trial and 
unavailable for cross-examination if the hearsay statements bore “adequate indicia of 
reliability…inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted 
                                                             
30 Buzawa, Eva S., and Carl G. Buzawa. Domestic Violence: the Criminal Justice Response. Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage 
Publications, 2003. 
31 Klein, Andrew R., and Jessica L. Klein. Abetting Batterers: What Police, Prosecutors and Courts Aren’t Doing to 
Protect America’s Women. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016. 
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hearsay exception” or where there are “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”32 This 
meant that statements made by domestic abuse victims to dispatchers during 911 calls and 
statements made to the police and medical examiners  were generally admissible under state and 
federal rules of evidence. These rules carve out exceptions to hearsay. According to Federal 
Rules of Evidence rule 801, hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”33 
Hearsay statements are generally objectionable and inadmissible in court unless the statement 
falls under a hearsay exception under rule 803 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. These 
exceptions allow for, among other things, “excited utterances” and “statements for the purposes 
of medical diagnosis or treatment” to be admitted in court. Consequently, under the rule of 
Roberts, statements made during 911 calls were generally considered to fall under the excited 
utterance exception, statements about injury were generally admitted as statements for purposes 
of medical diagnosis or treatment, and statements made to responding police officers were 
categorized as reliable in a variety of different ways. In the case of Maria and Mike, most all of 
Maria’s statements would have been admissible under Roberts.  Excited utterances are 
statements “relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the 
stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.”34 Maria’s statements to the 911 dispatcher 
and to the police who responded were on the topic of the startling event of abuse, and testifying 
officers would need to say no more than “the victim seemed stressed” or describe that the victim 
was trembling or her voice was shaking to establish the stress of the situation and qualify a 
                                                             
32 Ohio v. Roberts. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).  
33Fed. Rules Evid. 801(c). 
34 Fed. Rules Evid. 803(2). 
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statement as an excited utterance.35 Under the rule of Ohio v. Roberts statements which identified 
abusers, described crimes, and established integral facts of criminal cases were being admitted 
into evidence without cross-examination despite the Sixth Amendment guarantee that “in all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to… be confronted with the witnesses 
against him.”36 
In 2004 the United States Supreme Court issued a landmark opinion, Crawford v. 
Washington. This decision tackled the issue of statements being offered to prove cases without 
being subject to cross examination. This case overturned Ohio v. Roberts and created a new 
framework that dictated the admissibility of hearsay statements in court. Prior to the Crawford 
decision the Sixth Amendment coupled with Ohio v. Roberts generally had more bark than bite 
and allowed for a “heads I win, tails you lose” system that was unforgiving to criminal 
defendants in all criminal cases.37 Crawford turned this around but impeded the progress of 
evidence-based prosecutions and catalyzed a lineage of further Supreme Court decisions that 
wrestled with the Confrontation Clause and unavailable witnesses. Each subsequent decision has 
changed the landscape of evidence-based prosecution, but none has ironed out all the wrinkles of 
the system. Today, Crawford dictates the rules for legal proceedings without victim involvement, 
but subsequent cases have dulled its effect in protecting the Sixth Amendment. Both evidence-
based prosecution and the Confrontation Clause play important roles in protecting individuals 
and it is imperative that each of these values be allowed to function symbiotically with one 
another.  
                                                             
35 King-Ries, Andrew, “Crawford v. Washington: The End of Victimless Prosecution?,” Seattle U. L. Rev., (January 1, 
2005) p.301. 
36 United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment. 
37 Stras, David, Orin Kerr, Rachel Barkow, Stephanos Bibas, and Paul J. Larkin Jr., “Justice Scalia and the Criminal 
Law,” U. Cin. L. Rev. 743(86); (2018). 
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Crawford v. Washington and the New Framework 
 Crawford v. Washington was granted certiorari by the United States Supreme Court in 
2004 and was decided unanimously in favor of the petitioner, Michael Crawford. Justice Antonin 
Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court and Justice Rehnquist authored a concurring opinion. 
Michael Crawford had been charged with assault and attempted murder; although this case 
resulted in serious consequences for domestic violence cases, it was not itself a domestic 
violence case. In 1999, Sylvia Crawford informed her husband, Michael Crawford, that a man by 
the name of Kenneth Lee had tried to rape her.38 In response, Michael and Sylvia went to Lee’s 
apartment and Michael stabbed him. Michel Crawford was arrested the same night and both 
Sylvia and Michael were interrogated by the police at the police station.39 Michael told the police 
that a fight had ensued after Sylvia disclosed that Lee had attempted to rape her, and Michael had 
stabbed Kenneth Lee in the torso. Sylvia’s interrogation was recorded and her story matched 
Michael’s at nearly every point save whether Lee had pulled a weapon on Michael before or after 
Michael attacked.40 Michael Crawford claimed self-defense and asserted marital privilege for his 
trial, and consequently Sylvia Crawford was barred from testifying in-person and deemed legally 
unavailable.41 However, Washington’s marital privilege law allows for admissible hearsay 
statements by the accused’s spouse to be admitted, and the prosecution played the recording of 
Sylvia’s interrogation for the jury.42 The Washington State Supreme Court decided that the 
statements were reliable because they interlocked with Michael’s account of the stabbing.43 
During her interrogation Sylvia Crawford told the police that she had helped facilitate a planned 
                                                             
38 Crawford v. Washington at 36. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Crawford v. Washington at 37.  
41 Crawford v. Washington at 38.  
42 Crawford v. Washington. at 36.  
43 Crawford v. Washington at 39. 
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attack and her account of whether Lee had pulled a weapon undermined Michael’s self-defense 
claim.44 Sylvia’s statements helped convict Michael of both assault and attempted murder despite 
never having been subject to cross-examination. Michael Crawford appealed and cited a 
violation of his Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation. The United States Supreme Court 
heard the case and issued an opinion which would overturn Roberts and change the relationship 
between hearsay rules and the Sixth Amendment. 
The United States Supreme Court overturned the decision of the Washington State 
Supreme Court and determined that the use of Sylvia Crawford’s unconfronted statements 
violated Michael Crawford’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The Court began narrating 
its decision by turning to the historical background of the Confrontation Clause. Justice Scalia 
wrote that the right to confrontation can be traced back to Roman times but was bolstered under 
English Common Law.45 In 1603 Sir Walter Raleigh was charged with treason, and during his 
trial an alleged accomplice’s letter which discussed Raleigh’s involvement in the crime was read 
to the jury. Raleigh asserted that the alleged accomplice was not writing for truth but writing in 
self-interest and called for the alleged accomplice to be brought to the stand to testify in person. 
The presiding judge denied the request—Raleigh was convicted and sentenced to death.46 In 
response to this trial, the English law was reformed to require confrontation “face to face.”47 This 
historic trial marks the origin of fears about trial by affidavit.48 In 1791 the Sixth Amendment 
was ratified, and the rule of cross-examination secured in Common Law in 1693 was being 
abided by in American legal systems.49 Additionally, many early United States state court 
                                                             
44 Crawford v. Washington at 37.  
45 Crawford v. Washington at 41. 
46 Crawford v. Washington at 43. 
47 Ibid.  
48 Ibid. 
49 Crawford v. Washington at 45. 
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decisions reflected utmost adherence to the protection of the right to confrontation.50 Justice 
Scalia concluded that this history demonstrated that ex parte, (from the party, one-sided) 
examinations were to be prevented by confrontation and that the law of evidence should not 
supersede the rule of the United States Constitution and should apply to all testimony, both in- 
and out-of-court made by “witnesses”.51 Justice Scalia looked to the dictionary definitions of 
“witnesses” and “testimony” to clarify his opinion about where the Confrontation Clause applies: 
It applies to “witnesses” against the accused—in other words, those who “bear 
testimony” … “Testimony,” in turn, is typically “[a] solemn declaration or affirmation 
made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.52  
 
Scalia’s decision clarified that any statements made by “witnesses” and considered to be 
“testimonial,” whether made in- or out-of-court, must satisfy the Confrontation Clause before 
becoming admissible in court. The Court chose not to define what makes a statement testimonial 
save identifying a few core classes:  
Various formulations of this core class of “testimonial” statements exist “ex parte in-
court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, custodial 
examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar 
pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially… 
extrajudicial statements… contained in formalized testimonial materials such as 
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions… statements that were made 
under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the 
statement would be available for use at a later trial.53 
 
The result of this definition is a stricter, but ambiguous understanding of the Sixth Amendment. 
The “primary object” of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause is testimonial hearsay—
hearsay that is testimonial must have been subject to an opportunity for cross-examination while 
nontestimonial hearsay is governed by the Rules of Evidence.54 
                                                             
50 Ibid. 
51 Crawford v. Washington at 49. 
52 Crawford v. Washington at 50.  
53 Ibid.  
54 Crawford v. Washington at 52. 
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Crawford v. Washington also set the requirement that in order for testimonial hearsay to 
be admitted, the declarant-witness must either be present for trial to testify, or unavailable to 
testify and have been previously subject to cross-examination.55 The Court asserted that the 
Roberts’ doctrine was incapable of protecting the original values of the Confrontation Clause 
because it was simultaneously too broad and too narrow.56 The ruling did not distinguish 
admissibility requirements between ex parte testimony and other hearsay, and allowed for 
statements to be admitted under ambiguous requirements of reliability. The Confrontation Clause 
was intended to be a procedure which guarantees reliability, not a tool to use only when there are 
suspicions that evidence may be unreliable.57 “Dispensing with confrontation because testimony 
is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. 
This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.”58 
Crawford warns of the dangers of leaving too much power up to individual judicial 
discretion. Malleable rules can easily be manipulated, and even when the manipulation is utilized 
to secure a positive end, the underlying dangerous effects can undermine rights. Standards 
should be solid and understandable to ensure uniformity and fairness across judicial 
jurisdictions—the same “meaningful protection” of Sixth Amendment rights could not be 
guaranteed under the unpredictable framework of Roberts.59 The Crawford decision overturned 
Roberts, though not retroactively and not clearly. Although the Crawford opinion expresses 
concern over ambiguities and loose ends of the Roberts ruling, the opinion left ambiguous and 
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loose the integral definition of “testimonial statements” and chose to “leave for another day any 
effort to spell out a comprehensive definition.”60  
Ambiguities in Interpretation 
Following the issuance of the Crawford decision, judicial jurisdictions were left waiting 
for the day that a clearer definition would be handed down from the Supreme Court. This 
definitional ambiguity left prosecutors utilizing evidence-based prosecution strategies for 
domestic violence cases with questions about how to go forward with their procedures without 
violating the new Crawford framework and further, the Sixth Amendment. Prosecutors struggled 
to successfully bring forward intimate-partner violence cases without the involvement of the 
victim. The Administrative Office of the Courts for Washington State followed domestic 
violence conviction rates from 1999 to 2010 and discovered that beginning in 2004 there was a 
dramatic decrease in the number of successful convictions.61 Sixty prosecutor’s offices located in 
California, Oregon, and Washington were surveyed following the Crawford decision. Sixty-three 
percent of the responding offices asserted that Crawford “significantly impeded prosecutions of 
domestic violence;” seventy-six percent reported that they were more likely to drop charges for 
domestic violence altogether if the victim’s participation could not be secured.62 More than half 
of the surveyed prosecutor’s offices were counting on the use of testimonial hearsay in more than 
fifty percent of their domestic violence cases; following the Crawford decision, this number 
dropped to thirty-two percent, and that percentage required a broad interpretation of the 
decision.63 The roadblock that Crawford put in place extended to inhibit law enforcement, as 
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well. The lackluster prosecution success across the board created a lack of incentive for law 
enforcement to target aggressors of intimate-partner violence.64 Most alarmingly, in the same 
survey of prosecutor’s offices, sixty-five percent of the surveyed offices believed that their 
jurisdictions were less safe for victims of intimate-partner violence than before.65 It is here that 
the conflict between Crawford’s effects and the successful protection of victims of intimate-
partner violence is most clearly understood— if Crawford and the Sixth Amendment operated at 
full force then  either evidence-based prosecution must fall by the wayside and intimate-partner 
violence could be hidden behind closed doors, or evidence-based prosecution could be practiced 
but a small exception would have to be cut from the understanding of the Confrontation Clause. 
Crawford created an ambiguous test that could either be followed at the risk of sacrificing 
evidence-based prosecution and reprivatizing intimate-partner abuse or manipulated in order to 
present a case without victim testimony.   
Immediate Consequences of Crawford 
In response, Judges in different jurisdictions across the country interpreted Crawford in 
very different ways and developed a variety of different tests to determine whether statements 
were testimonial. The different jurisdictional decisions demonstrate a lack of clarity surrounding 
how far Sixth Amendment protections extend and a lack of consistency, even among decisions 
made within the same state. For example, in Texas’s Court of Appeals Twelfth District the court 
applied the “primary purpose test” to classify statements as testimonial and applied Roberts 
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when the court ruled statements nontestimonial.66 Spencer v. State67 from Texas’s Fourteenth 
District Appellate Court and Moore v. State from the Sixth District each used a combination of a 
“formality test” and the “primary purpose test” to determine whether a statement was 
testimonial.68 However, at the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas the court opted for an entirely 
new test to pass down to the district courts. Wall v. State from the Court of Criminal Appeals 
adopted the “reasonable expectation” test to identify testimonial statements.69 In California, in 
the Sixth Appellate District, the case People v. Caudillo70 adopted a compound test of “primary 
purpose” and a “core class” test while the Second Appellate District adopted a bright-line rule 
that spontaneous statements are not hearsay and wove the “formality” test through the People v. 
Corella opinion.71 In New York, a criminal court in Bronx County ruled in People v. Moscat that 
911 calls are per se not testimonial under the “primary purpose test.”72 However, the Supreme 
Court of New York turned the Moscat reasoning upside-down and determined that 911 calls are 
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actually per se testimonial due to their formality and the “reasonable expectation test.”73 An 
appellate court in Ohio ruled that Crawford is only applicable to hearsay statements that do not 
fall under Common Law hearsay exceptions.74 In Massachusetts, the State Supreme Court 
determined in Commonwealth v. Gonsalves that statements made to police during the course of 
an investigation are per se testimonial unless the police are involved in “caretaking or stabilizing 
a volatile situation.”75 The Sixth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals decided that a 
“statement made knowingly to authorities describing criminal activity is almost always 
testimonial” as a general premise for the reasonable expectation test.76 The vast differences in 
court rulings across the nation, and even between jurisdictions within the same states 
demonstrate that Crawford’s promise of “interim uncertainty” held true. In general, court 
decisions can be characterized by having used one, or a combination of, four kinds of tests: 
“formality,” “reasonable expectation,” “primary purpose,” and bright-line rules. Although there 
are a few jurisdictions which produced outliers to these categories, these four provide the 
framework for understanding the ambiguity following Crawford as well as the framework for 
potential steps at settling the uncertainty.  
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Post-Crawford Concerns 
Even fourteen years after the Crawford decision, and many years after subsequent court 
rulings made to clarify the ambiguous requirements of Crawford, these tests are being applied in 
different manners across the country. The formality test measures whether the circumstances of 
when the statement was made were formal enough to indicate that the statement was more than a 
casual statement to a friend, but rather more similar to depositions taken by magistrates under the 
Common Law.77 Under this test, statements made to law enforcement officers in response to 
structured questioning, in secured or official areas, or recorded statements that are preserved in 
an official capacity are often encapsulated under the definition of testimonial. The reasonable 
expectation test, sometimes referred to as the “objective observer test” measures whether an 
observer (or the declarant) would reasonably expect from the circumstances surrounding their 
statement, that their statement will be used for either prosecutorial purposes or to aid in an 
investigation.78 The primary purpose test, which was later articulated in the Supreme Court case 
Davis v. Washington (2006) classifies statements as testimonial if the primary purpose is to 
“prove past facts potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution” and nontestimonial “when 
made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing 
emergency.”79 The main difference between the primary purpose test and the reasonable 
expectation test is the point of view. The primary purpose test hinges on whether the police are 
eliciting statements with prosecution in mind, and the reasonable expectation test determines 
whether a statement is testimonial based on the mindset of the declarant-witness. Finally, bright-
line tests qualify specific kinds of statements or statements made in particular settings as either 
per se testimonial or per se nontestimonial. 
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Crawford’s ambiguous decision left the door open for diverse tests to be used which led 
to unpredictable results. The decision allowed courts a great amount of latitude within which to 
build their Sixth Amendment framework and left a multitude of questions unanswered. How do 
evidence-based prosecutions go forward following Crawford, if at all? How do courts manage 
hearsay after the Sixth Amendment has been satisfied? Is Roberts overturned in its entirety or do 
indicia of reliability serve as an acceptable basis of admittance for hearsay if Crawford is 
satisfied? What should courts make of statements to advocates, medical examiners, or off-duty 
police officers? Which test best protects the integrity of the Sixth Amendment but also does not 
re-privatize domestic violence, sexual assault cases, and child abuse cases where the victim may 
become unavailable? Lower courts attempted to answer some of these unanswered questions 
within the wide scope of directional latitude they were granted by the Crawford decision. 
However, this wide scope created dangers for the integrity of the courts, the protection of the 
Sixth Amendment, and the efficacy of evidence-based prosecution. Justice Scalia warned of this 
danger within the Crawford decision: 
[The Framers] knew that judges, like other government officers, could not always be 
trusted to safeguard the rights of the people… They were loath to leave too much 
discretion in judicial hands. By replacing categorical constitutional guarantees with open-
ended balancing tests, we do violence to their design. Vague standards are manipulable, 
and, while that might be a small concern in run-of the-mill assault prosecutions like this 
one, the Framers had an eye toward politically charged cases like Raleigh’s—great state 
trials where the impartiality of even those at the highest levels of the judiciary might not 
be so clear. It is difficult to imagine Roberts’ providing any meaningful protection in 
those circumstances.80  
 
Justice Scalia warned about affording judges too much latitude for discretionary power, putting 
too much faith in open-ended tests, and for implementing manipulable standards and cautioned 
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that Roberts was a danger and not a tool for constitutional protection. Justice Scalia is famous for 
being an originalist and was a staunch advocate for minimizing the amount of discretionary 
power that judges had, in general.81 However, Crawford’s lack of a concise definition of 
testimonial and what the Sixth Amendment presides over allowed for the Crawford progeny to 
expand and twist the Crawford ruling. The effect that Crawford had on the efficacy of evidence-
based prosecution may have been, and could still be, shaping the interpretations of the Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Clause.82 Crawford has been worked to the point that at the present-
day juncture, statements that the Framers and Justice Scalia may have anticipated the Sixth 
Amendment to cover are not in fact protected by the Confrontation Clause, and the current Sixth 
Amendment protections are circling back to the same feeble protections offered under the 
Roberts framework. 
 Further, the Crawford v. Washington decision puts prosecutors of intimate-partner 
violence in a difficult position. In order to go forward with evidence-based prosecution they must 
either potentially abuse the Sixth Amendment’s right to confrontation or pressure victims to 
testify earlier or more aggressively than is ideal.83 The victims of intimate-partner violence are 
similarly put between a rock and a hard place—either choose to participate and face potential 
consequences of retribution and threats, or face the consequences of letting the perpetrator go 
free when the charges are dropped due to a lack of evidence consequential of choosing not to 
participate.84  
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Purpose of Thesis 
This thesis will consider how to restore the function of Crawford in a way which does not 
re-privatize domestic violence. The story of Maria and Mike will serve as a scenario to apply to 
multiple forthcoming examples to in order to clarify points and allow for abstract concepts to be 
applied more concretely. This thesis will consider the implications of Crawford and its progeny 
and suggest multiple policies and definitions which should be adopted in order to settle the 
“interim uncertainty” which has remained pervasive since Crawford in 2004.85 
The subsequent chapters of this thesis will argue that the Crawford lineage of cases has 
weakened the effects of the Crawford decision in a manner that warns of a judicial overstep. I 
will consider how it is imperative that courts not enter a vicious cycle where the strength of the 
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation ebbs and flows with further Supreme Court decisions, 
but simultaneously argue that protecting evidence-based prosecution is essential to protecting 
victims of intimate-partner violence in Chapter Three. The answer to the Crawford cycle of 
constitutional crisis which conflicts with evidence-based prosecution is not simply further 
judicial decisions, but rather a commitment to clear definitions and jurisdictional commitments 
to policy solutions. This thesis will clearly lay out the subsequent decisions which contributed to 
the weakening of Crawford and provide suggestions for policy solutions that require efforts from 
the courts, law enforcement, community support systems, and prosecutors in order to provide 
equal protection to both the Amendment and the accused as well as victims of intimate partner 
violence.  
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Chapter 2: Cases and Consequences 
Crawford v. Washington left the relationship between the Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause and out-of-court statements in a haze of “interim uncertainty” until 2006 
when the Supreme Court decided two cases in a combined opinion known as Davis v. 
Washington.86 Davis combined two fact patterns, and the ultimate holding rendered the primary 
purpose test the law of the land for determining which statements are testimonial, and therefore 
subject to the Confrontation Clause, and which are not.  Justice Scalia wrote the opinion and 
elaborated the rule as: 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under 
circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable 
police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant 
to later criminal prosecution.87 
 
A corresponding footnote in the majority opinion notes that the Davis fact patterns were only 
expansive enough to allow the Court to decide on the issue of testimonial statements as they 
relate to police interrogations and where the role of police and responsibility of interrogation can 
extend to 911 operators.88 Thus, this holding does not comment on the testimonial nature of 
statements made to non-law enforcement officers or off-duty officers, nor does it dictate a rule 
on statements made to officers without provocation or questioning from an officer. The fact 
patterns of these two cases are significant for comparison and contrast to subsequent decisions in 
the Crawford progeny and make a difference in the workability of the primary purpose test that 
the facts ultimately led to.  
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Davis v. Washington Fact Pattern 
 In Davis v. Washington, Michelle McCottry made a 911 call which disconnected, and led 
to a return call from the operator.89 The operator established through questioning that McCottry 
had called because she was being abused in her home by her ex-boyfriend.90 The operator asked 
if there were weapons used or alcohol involved, and McCottry reported “He’s usin’ his fists,” 
and the alleged abuser had not been drinking.91 It was at this point that the 911 operator informed 
McCottry that help was on the way and she was to stay on the line and listen while additional 
questions were asked.92 The 911 operator gathered the full name of the alleged abuser, Adrian 
Martell Davis, and then McCottry informed the operator that Davis was running and leaving in a 
car.93 The operator told McCottry to “Stop talking and answer my questions,” and proceeded to 
accumulate information about Davis, including his birthday, reason for being present at the 
house, and additional information about the assault.94 The police arrived at the scene 
approximately four minutes after the call and observed McCottry as “shaken” and “frantic.”95 
McCottry did not testify in the subsequent trial against Adrian Davis, but her recorded 
statements made during the 911 call were played to the jury; with those statements, the two 
testifying officers were able to connect McCottry’s injuries to her account of the attack.96 Davis 
was convicted and the Supreme Court of Washington determined that the portion of the call 
which identified Davis was not testimonial.97 
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Hammon v. Indiana Fact Pattern 
 Hammon v. Indiana is also a case of intimate-partner violence, but the facts are quite 
different. The victim, Amy Hammon, did not reach out to the police, herself, but rather police 
responded to her and her husband, Hershel Hammon, after receiving a report of a domestic 
disturbance.98 When the police arrived, Amy was on her porch and perceived as “somewhat 
frightened,” though she informed the police that nothing was wrong and gave permission to go 
inside of her home.99 The police observed a broken heating unit and shattered glass in the living 
room and found Hershel Hammon in the kitchen.100 One officer asked Amy to explain what had 
happened; meanwhile, Hershel made multiple attempts to interrupt and interject this 
conversation.101 Amy told police that she had been shoved and hit, furniture was broken, her van 
was made unusable, and her daughter was attacked.102 She signed a battery affidavit including 
this information.103 
 Amy did not appear for Hershel’s trial, but the questioning officer narrated her statements 
and provided authentication for the battery affidavit.104 Both Amy’s hearsay statements and the 
affidavit were admitted as “excited utterances” and a “present sense impression,” respectively, 
despite objections regarding the Sixth Amendment.105 The affidavit was determined to be 
testimonial due to its use as a preservative of potential evidence, but its admission was ruled to 
be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.106 
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Comparison of Temporal Reasoning in Davis and Hammon 
 The key differences in these two cases lie within the timeline and the formality of the 
events; however, it is not these differences that necessarily underlie the reasoning for the 
differing determinations regarding the testimonial nature of the victims’ statements. The 
circumstances of each intimate-partner attack are important to note because they demonstrate 
inconsistencies within these decisions and future decisions pertaining to the Sixth Amendment 
which come before the court. Namely, during the phone call with the 911 operator, Michelle 
McCottry specifically states that the perpetrator was leaving. It is not entirely clear from the 
decision precisely when the ongoing emergency ends and the ensuing questioning becomes an 
interrogation that produced testimonial statements, but it seems as though when the threat was 
separated from the threatened the words that McCottry spoke were no longer the narration of 
events as they took place, but rather a recantation of past events and statements which would 
serve as the functional equivalent of testimony elicited in court. The operator asked McCottry 
specific questions about Davis including his birthday and reasons for being present at the home. 
Knowledge of an alleged abuser’s birthday cannot be integral to resolving an emergency; the 
information goes to further proving the identity of an alleged perpetrator to allow for easier 
searches of records, but it does not serve the purpose of stopping an attack and resolving an 
emergency. Further, the operator asked for the reason why Davis was present at the home107. 
This question and its consequent answer provide information about the means which made a 
crime possible or the motive for the ensuing attack, but they do little to provide a remedy to the 
abuse which had just ensued. This narration of past events, the narration of why Davis was in the 
home in the first place, resembles the kind of story which, if she had chosen to be involved with 
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the prosecution, Michelle McCottry would have taken the stand to repeat during a trial against 
Davis. However, one of the cited reasons why McCottry’s phone call and a few of her statements 
to the arriving police officers were admitted as nontestimonial excited utterances and present 
sense impressions was because she had been narrating events as they were occurring.108 
However, following Davis’s departure from the home, this is less convincing. 
 In the case of Amy and Hershel Hammon, the statements of Amy Hammon were ruled 
testimonial because when the officers arrived, the statements that she gave to officers were those 
which narrated past events and the previous emergency was no longer unfolding. This creates an 
interesting tension between the reasoning of Hammon and the reasoning of Davis. In Hammon, 
the alleged abuser was still present at the home and was actively trying to insert himself into 
situations with his victim, despite police action to stop him. The situation was no longer an 
emergency despite the perpetrator and the victim still being in proximity to one another and the 
perpetrator exhibiting aggressive tendencies. On the other hand, McCottry was ruled to have 
been facing an ongoing emergency even when the alleged abuser had fled the scene and 
separated himself from his victim. The distance did not resolve the emergency. The temporal 
differences of these two fact patterns, however, may justify the decisions regarding 
emergencies—McCottry’s phone call spanned from during, or just after the attack to only 
minutes after the attack while Hammon’s discussions with officers may have taken place any 
span of time after the attack had commenced. However, because of the factual differences 
regarding the presence of the threat tell a different story—McCottry’s threat had departed while 
Hammon was left for a span of time alone, with her attacker present. The decisions defining an 
ongoing emergency in these cases demonstrate that defining “emergency” is a temporal decision 
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in relation to the freshness of the crime instead of a decision based on whether the threatening 
subject has been separated from the threatened subject. 
 Consider the Mike and Maria hypothetical in comparison to Davis and Michelle 
McCottry’s statements. Maria was calling 911 to report that her husband had beaten her and that 
he had already left the home, but no more than five minutes ago. She notes that an ambulance is 
necessary to tend to her head wound. She also notes that Mike owns a gun, had threatened her 
with it in the past, and she does not know if he has it with him or not. Maria is certainly relaying 
information about a past crime to an arm of the police in response to structured questioning. Her 
words, which incriminate her husband Mike, connect him to physical evidence and injury, and 
ultimately lead to his arrest certainly serve as an out-of-court alternative to in-court testimony. 
Now consider Michelle McCottry’s statements. She relays Davis’s name and connects him to the 
crime by identifying his weapon (his fists) and describing that “he’s here jumpin’ on me again” 
(emphasis added).109 These statements by McCottry were ruled to be nontestimonial because 
they were made during the course of an ongoing emergency considering that Davis was still 
present at the home while McCottry was responding. What if in the hypothetical Maria had 
specifically said, “He was here jumpin’ on me again,” and responded to “Are there any 
weapons?” with “No. He was usin’ his fists.”? These words would identical to the nontestimonial 
statements made by Michelle McCottry save the tense of these statements. The statements would 
have been in the past tense but describing events that happened no more than five minutes ago. 
This comparison demonstrates that the difference between what is considered nontestimonial and 
what is likely considered testimonial lies in the tense of the statement and not in the accusatory 
function of the statements. Whether in past or present tense, each of these statements serve the 
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purpose of accusing another person of a crime in response to formalized, structured questioning 
by agents of the police. Whether past or present tense, each of these statements are declarations 
or affirmations “made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”110 The fact that 
Davis is able to separate testimonial statements from the declarant and the function of  proving 
fact and make them into affirmations conditional on time and relationship to an emergency 
separates Davis from the initial force of Crawford. This test should not discriminate against 
statements based on the tense the declarant uses nor entirely invalidate victim statements because 
they were not safe enough or able to call for help until the dangerous situation had calmed.   
Comparison of Formality Between Davis and Hammon 
The formality of the two modes of questioning also played a role in contrasting the two 
cases but did not necessarily find its way into defining the parameters of testimonial. In Davis 
the questioning took place over a 911 phone call. The call was determined to be informal and 
therefore less likely to be testimonial; however, many jurisdictions and 911 training programs 
have a specific and structured script for 911 operators to stick to while gathering information to 
dispatch officers. For example, consider these instructions for responding to calls reporting 
domestic violence from a 911 dispatch officer student manual created by the New Jersey 
Division of Criminal Justice:111 
During a call for assistance, the dispatcher should ask the following questions: 
 1. Where is the emergency? What address? What apartment number?  
2. Who am I speaking to?  
3. What has happened? 
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4. Has anyone been injured?  If yes, is an ambulance needed? 
5. Are you the victim? If no, are you a witness?  
6. Is the suspect present? What is his/her name? Please describe the suspect. If the 
suspect is not present, where does the caller believe the suspect is. 
7. Are weapons involved?  If yes, what kind?  
8. Is the suspect under the influence of drugs or alcohol? If yes, what substance?  
9. Are children present? If yes, how many? How old?  
10. Are other people present? If yes, how many?  
11. Have the police been to this address before? If yes, how many times? When was the 
last time? 
12. Does the victim have a current restraining order? 
13. A telephone number where the caller can be called back. 
A comparison of the order, text, and purpose of these questions to the questions used by the 911 
operator in the Mike and Maria hypothetical which were based off a different training manual 
demonstrate that the general organization and structure of these calls are nearly identical across 
different jurisdictions. There is rhythm and reason to each question and the question that follows 
which makes the operation of the calls and the ensuing response more streamlined. With this in 
mind, consider the definition of “formality” from the Merriam Webster Dictionary: “compliance 
with formal or conventional rules; an established form or procedure that is required or 
conventional.”112 The congruence of the form between different jurisdictions demonstrates that 
this procedure is both established and conventional, which would qualify 911 calls as formalized 
interrogations. However, the approach that the Davis v. Washington decision takes frames 911 
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calls as often the opposite because the caller, in this case McCottry, was answering questions 
over the phone and in a chaotic setting.113 This take on the interrogation’s formality is 
problematic because it shifts the role of the integral viewpoint away from the interrogator and to 
the person answering questions—this is the opposite of the integral viewpoint in the primary 
purpose test—and makes this structured questioning nontestimonial because the respondent is 
not constrained by formality. This conflicts with the Court’s Crawford holding which made 
interrogations by law enforcement a core class, and particularly at odds with Justice Scalia’s 
footnote four: 
We use the term “interrogation” in its colloquial, rather than any technical legal, sense 
(citation omitted) … Just as various definitions of “testimonial” exist, one can imagine 
various definitions of “interrogation,” and we need not select among them in this case. 
Sylvia’s recorded statement, knowingly given in response to structured police 
questioning, qualifies under any conceivable definition (emphasis added).114 
 
The Supreme Court determined in Davis that the 911 operator questioning McCottry was an act 
of the police.115 If “under any conceivable definition” knowingly given responses to structured 
police questioning are testimonial, then McCottry’s knowingly given statements made in 
response to structured questioning by a police agent should have been considered testimonial. 
However, the Court notedly made a viewpoint shift which saved the case. In Crawford, 
interrogations were made to be such by the structure and function of the questions and the officer 
asking such questions; no mention was made of an additional qualification for the respondent to 
be of a particular demeanor or cognizant of a formality level. In Davis, the Court justified their 
addendum to the once clear core class by inserting “and of course even when interrogation exists 
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it is in the final analysis the declarant’s statements, not the interrogators questions, that the 
Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.”116 
 The problem with this viewpoint shift is not that it considers the perspective and 
demeanor of the respondent, but that it is inconsistent with the remainder of the Davis decision, 
is a form of cherry-picking rules to achieve a desired result, and distorts the core class that had 
been clearly laid out in Crawford. The determination of a statement’s testimonial nature should 
either be based upon an analysis of the questioner’s viewpoint, the declarant’s viewpoint, 
specifically defined as a joint-test, or a different test altogether—but what the Court should not 
do is flip-flop which viewpoint is scrutinized to avoid coming to an unattractive conclusion, 
namely that 911 calls are structured police questioning and per se testimonial.  I do not argue that 
911 calls should be per se testimonial, but rather I make this point to show that if formality hints 
at a testimonial nature, and structured questioning by police officers or agents is per se 
testimonial, then the formalized, structured nature of 911 calls should be testimonial under this 
definition—but they are not. This points at an inconsistency which was created to make cases 
workable for the prosecution, which is not a fair reason for a decision.  
Testimony Erroneously Made the Product of a Relationship 
The Davis decision further differs from Crawford and creates difficulties for the 
workability of the primary purpose testimonial test because it makes testimonial statements the 
products of a relationship instead of inherent members of core classes and products of witnesses. 
In Crawford the active voice belongs to the declarant, and it is the declarant who has the power 
to turn a statement into one that is either testimonial or nontestimonial. For example, “an accuser 
who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person 
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who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.”117  The difference between these two 
kinds of statements (casual remarks and testimony) is not their relationship, or lack thereof, to an 
emergency, nor differences in the primary purposes of the police officers’ questions. Rather, the 
difference between these two kinds of statements regards the level of solemnity of the speaker 
and the speaker’s function. To bear testimony or witness against someone requires no 
relationship other than an active speaker and a present listener. Taking such action to formulate 
such a statement does not require particular external environmental factors nor a specific type of 
listener, but only the active choice by a declarant to voice or write a statement which has the 
effect of establishing or proving some fact. A “formal statement to government officers” can be 
made inside or outside the constraints of an ongoing emergency, and Crawford pays no mind to 
the subsequent actions of the law enforcement officer when making the assertion that this formal 
statement would be testimonial. The declarant should bear the power to create a testimonial 
statement, not situational factors—if the speaker makes a “solemn declaration or affirmation 
made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact,” then the statement made was 
testimonial. Davis, on the other hand, distorts this clear understanding by switching the point of 
view and the creative power to the law enforcement officer and the circumstances surrounding 
each statement. When statements made during police interrogations are surrounded by 
circumstances that suggest an emergency must be attended to by police and the statements would 
be helpful in reaching a resolution to that emergency, then the circumstances and the necessity of 
the police to respond to the emergency override the creative power of the declarant. The 
declarant is removed from the active role of creating testimony based on the subject and inherent 
accusatory value of her statement and put in the passive role of having testimony, or 
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nontestimonial statements elicited from her. Consequently, testimonial statements become a 
product of their environment rather than an inherent form of speech like imperative, declarative, 
interrogatory, and exclamatory statements. Some scholars, including Justice Scalia, himself, held 
the belief that it was too subjective to make a determination about the intent of the declarant 
while they made a statement and that this subjectivity required the testimonial test to concentrate 
on the purpose of the second-party, whether a listener or a law enforcement agent.118  It can be 
derived from Davis that nearly identical statements made under different circumstances can be 
classified differently as long as the relationship to an emergency or the intent of the listener can 
be argued as different. This is neither workable, nor does it protect from the abuses that the Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Clause was implemented to protect against.   
The Diminished Scope of Testimonial Core Classes 
 Crawford laid out that the core classes which were named in Chapter One “all share a 
common nucleus and then define the Clause’s coverage at various levels of abstraction around 
it” (emphasis added).119 These core classes include “statements taken by police officers in the 
course of interrogations” and make no mention of an additional condition for an absence of an 
emergency-in-progress or for the primary motivation of the interrogator to be to collect evidence 
for an impending prosecution.120 Rather, the decision calls for statements made in the course of 
police interrogation to be a core upon which additional protections are built. Adding conditionals 
where statements made in the course of police interrogation are testimonial only if made when 
there are no circumstances that indicate an ongoing emergency or only if the responses are 
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proving past fact chip away at the nucleus of this protection rather than garner additional 
protections outside of the core.121  
 The core classes of testimonial statements set forth in the Crawford decision have 
nothing to do with whether there is an ongoing emergency nor take in to any consideration the 
primary purpose of the police. Rather, these core classes establish that certain kinds of materials 
and statements inherently have the purpose of proving some fact and serve as the functional 
equivalent of a witness at trial.122 The purpose and function of these core classes is derived from 
either the expectation of the declarant, a level of formality, and the substance of the statements 
which make them inculpatory. The Framers were likely unconcerned with whether declarants 
had made statements used as ex parte evidence under conditions indicating an ongoing 
emergency, or whether they were ex parte regardless of exterior conditions. Ex parte testimony 
was subject to the Confrontation Clause. In the cases that Justice Scalia cites as early state 
decisions regarding the Sixth Amendment and the right to confrontation, the North Carolina 
Supreme Court held that “[I]t is a rule of the common law, founded on natural justice, that no 
man shall be prejudiced by evidence which he had not the liberty to cross examine.”123 The 
South Carolina high court found it an “indispensable condition” that “prosecutions be carried on 
to the conviction of the accused, by witnesses confronted by him, and subjected to his personal 
examinations.”124 Neither of these holdings include an addendum that cuts out an exception if the 
evidence was created during an ongoing emergency. 
It is important to consider that establishing or proving some fact during an emergency, 
whether past or present, can be one of the most important times to do so. Officers responding to 
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emergencies often must take statements to be fact in order to best respond to an emergency at 
hand. If a declarant states that John Doe ran toward the city center with a gun, then that statement 
will likely be taken as fact for the purpose of apprehending John Doe for a crime that includes a 
firearm. The emergency situation requires that facts be established. This creates a dual purpose 
for statements made during emergencies. They may be made for the purpose of establishing or 
proving some fact, but that very establishment of fact may aid law enforcement in both the 
resolution of an emergency, but also in the subsequent apprehension and conviction of a culprit 
of a crime. The reason that statements of a testimonial nature, considering that they prove or 
establish fact, aid in resolving emergencies should not alone be enough to inherently disqualify 
those statements from the broader definition of testimonial. Cutting statements with a testimonial 
purpose out of the testimonial definition because they are made during an ongoing emergency 
creates perverse incentives to maintain a perception of an emergency state whether it exists or 
not.125 
 Inconsistencies and distortion plague the Crawford progeny beginning with Davis, 
continuing in Michigan v. Bryant in 2011, and further affecting Ohio v. Clark in 2015. Analysis 
reveals that viewpoint shifts, expansions of definitions, and minimizations of core classes occur 
in these cases in a manner that severely damages a criminal defendant’s right to confrontation in 
all cases, but simultaneously discriminates against victims in domestic violence cases. The 
purpose of Crawford was to reestablish order to the system governing the admittance of out-of-
court statements and to reinvigorate the right to confrontation which the Sixth Amendment 
guarantees in all criminal proceedings. Those protections have been worn down through the 
lineage of cases following Crawford and consequently, criminal defendants face a system in 
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which out-of-court statements offered to prove facts about their behavior or a crime are being 
admitted as evidence without any opportunity for the credibility or reliability of the evidence to 
be tested through cross examination. 
Michigan v. Bryant Fact Pattern 
In 2011 the United States Supreme Court handed down another decision which shaped 
the jurisprudence covering the Confrontation Clause’s effects on out-of-court hearsay statements 
being used as evidence in criminal trials. Michigan v. Bryant was decided by a 6-2 vote and the 
opinion was authored by Justice Sotomayor. Both Justice Scalia and Justice Ginsburg dissented, 
and Justice Elena Kagan was not involved in deciding the matter.126 In Michigan v. Bryant, the 
victim, Anthony Covington, was shot through the porch door at the home of a man he believed to 
be Richard Perry Bryant.127 Twenty-five minutes after the shooting, police were dispatched and 
arrived at a gas station where Covington was found, lying in the parking lot, with a gunshot 
wound in his abdomen.128 Upon arrival, the police asked Covington “what had happened, who 
had shot him, and where the shooting had occurred.”129 Covington responded by narrating the 
story that he had been shot by “Rick” at approximately three in the morning, that he had been 
speaking with “Rick” from the porch and through the back door of Bryant’s home, but when he 
turned to leave, he had been shot through the door.130 He then drove to the gas station where he 
had been found. Additional officers subsequently arrived at the scene, and each one asked 
Covington the same, or similar questions. In all, five separate officers received consistent stories 
from Anthony Covington about the crime that had taken place nearly a half hour ago.131 Between 
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five and ten minutes later, emergency medical services approached the scene and moved 
Covington to a hospital where he died from his injuries.132 Consequently, Michigan v. Bryant 
was a case that tackled the Sixth Amendment from a non-domestic dispute lens and the witness 
was unavailable not due to fear or noncooperation, but rather because he was deceased at the 
time of Richard Bryant’s trial.  
 The prosecution in the Bryant case brought the five officers who responded to the scene 
to the stand to recount the statements that Covington made to them and narrate how his 
statements led to their subsequent actions. They visited Bryant’s home, discovered blood, a 
bullet, and a bullet hole in the door, as well as personal belongings and identification of 
Covington on the porch.133 Bryant and his lawyers took issue with the prosecution using the 
officers as vessels for relaying out-of-court statements made by Covington and argued on appeal 
that the admittance of Covington’s responses to the questions of what happened, who shot him, 
and where he was shot were a violation of Bryant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the 
witnesses against him because the statements were testimonial, pursuant to the decisions in 
Crawford v. Washington and Davis v. Washington. The case worked its way to the United States 
Supreme Court where the Court considered “whether the Confrontation Clause barred the 
admission at trial of Covington’s statements to the police.”134 The Court held that “the 
circumstances of the interaction between Covington and the police objectively indicate that the 
“primary purpose of the interrogation” was “to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing 
emergency.”135 To reach this conclusion, the Court assessed a multitude of situational factors and 
adopted a mode of thinking which resembled that of Roberts in a startling way.  
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The Expansion of the Ongoing Emergency Doctrine 
 The Court concluded that the only statements of concern to the Sixth Amendment are 
those made with the “primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial 
testimony.”136 Thus, any other purpose for the creation of evidence, including but not limited to 
the purposes of resolving an ongoing emergency, would be nontestimonial and admissible in 
court without confrontation. These purposes allude to hearsay law which was a cornerstone of 
the Roberts logic of reliability. Statements made for the primary purpose of a medical diagnosis 
or treatment are not made for trial, but for treatment.137 Other documents may be made for the 
purposes of a business records, or for the purposes of furthering a conspiracy. These are all not 
proffered for the purposes of serving as out-of-court substitutes for testimony, and therefore the 
Court majority argues that these are inherently reliable, and therefore admissible, without 
confrontation.138 The Court further expands this primary purpose test by loosely coupling the 
ongoing emergency doctrine with the rationale for indoctrinating the hearsay exception for 
excited utterances.  Namely, when one is distracted by an ongoing emergency, their focus shifts 
away from the purpose of proving past events and consequently their desire to fabricate a story 
for prosecution is squashed by the desire to project reliable information helpful to ending an 
emergency.139 This rationale mirrors the argument for the excited utterance exception—
circumstances of stress, shock, or feelings of excitement eradicate the chances of the declarant 
having been in a clear enough mindset to fabricate falsities.140 Some scholars argue that excited 
utterances, whether made during an ongoing emergency or not, are never made with a reasonable 
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idea that the statement will be used for a prosecutorial purpose.141 These statements as initial 
reports are frequently the most reliable and consistent with other physical and circumstantial 
evidence.142 This rationale supporting the admissibility of unconfronted statements made by 
witnesses during an ongoing emergency stands on the premise that if the circumstances 
surrounding a statement indicate that the statement is reliable, then the statement is admissible 
without violating the Confrontation Clause. This rationale supports the success of evidence-
based prosecution because trusting initial reports and admitting excited utterances as 
nontestimonial hearsay broadens the amount of prosecutorial evidence.143 However, admitting 
statements for reliability and to guarantee a result favorable for the prosecution is the same 
premise which Roberts stood on, and the same premise which was undermined by Crawford in 
2004. Bryant returns to the Confrontation Clause to a substantive guarantee instead of a 
procedural one as promised in Crawford.144 
 The Court utilized another viewpoint shift in the Bryant decision, making it clear that it is 
the viewpoint of a reasonable participant in the same circumstances that matters when 
determining the existence of an ongoing emergency.145 Would a reasonable person in the 
declarant’s position, knowing all of the relevant facts and circumstances which the declarant did, 
objectively believe that there was an ongoing emergency, and thus believe that their statements 
would be used to address that emergency, and not used for a future prosecution? This is the 
question put before the courts when determining whether statements are testimonial. However, 
the Court adds that the actual existence of an emergency is of little consequence—if a reasonable 
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person in the declarant’s position would be under the impression that there was an emergency, 
then their mindset would be affected in the same way as if there actually were an emergency, and 
thus, the Court argues, their statements would be reliable and nontestimonial.146 The Court 
argues that the existence of a medical emergency would be considered by a reasonable 
participant making a conclusion about the existence of an emergency, along with the type of 
weapon being used, the formality of the questioning, and the setting of the interrogation i.e. 
public or private. 147 Ultimately, the Court declared its decision an establishment of an objective 
analysis, but what was actually established presents itself as a multi-faceted consideration that 
has so many moving parts that can easily be manipulated by the prosecution to resemble an 
emergency and circumnavigate Crawford and the Sixth Amendment. This totality of the 
circumstances test is unworkable. The result of Michigan v. Bryant was not a final settlement of 
the interim uncertainty caused by Crawford, but rather an effective return to the uncertainties of 
Roberts where multi-part balancing tests rule in an unpredictable way. 
 The steps that the Court took to reach this holding were complicated, and thus the 
resulting precedent that the case set is complicated, unpredictable, and dangerous for both 
criminal defendants and victims of domestic violence. It creates “an expansive exception to the 
Confrontation Clause for violent crimes” and in the same vein effectively exempts victims of 
domestic violence from benefitting from this exception.148 
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Emergencies— A Product of Uncertainty 
The Bryant decision is distinguished from Davis as “a nondomestic, involving a victim 
found in a public location, suffering from a fatal gunshot wound, and a perpetrator whose 
location was unknown at the time the police located the victim.”149 From these facts, the Court 
concluded that the “ongoing emergency” was a potential threat which extended to both the police 
and members of the greater public. Thus, the ongoing emergency which the entire decision rests 
upon is one of hypothetical future danger made possible by the “nondomestic” nature and setting 
in a “public location.” Upon arrival, the responding officers were unaware of Covington’s 
identity, unsure of whether the shooting had taken place at the gas station or elsewhere, and 
further uncertain of whether the assailant was indeed a continuing threat to either Covington, the 
police, or the general public.150 According to the majority opinion, these uncertainties are the 
making of an emergency because, until the key facts about the scope of the situation at hand are 
established, the primary purpose of the investigators’ questioning is assumed to be to resolve any 
emergency that could be happening. Ultimately, the conclusion could be drawn that any situation 
where a victim has been injured and the reason for that injury is unknown to the responding law 
enforcement is an emergency until sufficient facts are established to show otherwise. What 
constitutes sufficient facts is, however, unclear because five separate officers interrogated 
Covington, and each of those officers was ruled to have been responding to an ongoing 
emergency. Evidently sufficient information to resolve an ongoing emergency is a blurry, but 
high bar. The opinion uses the fact that Covington did not make clear through his statements 
whether the emergency threat was individual to him or to the public as evidence that it was fair 
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for the police to assume that the threat was more broad.151 However, if the primary purpose or 
objective of the police was to resolve an ongoing emergency, it seems the quickest way to 
resolve such a situation is to determine whether such a situation exists. Hence, rather than asking 
questions of a dying man that elicited responses that would have paralleled “a routine direct 
examination,” the officers should have asked questions that would have gotten directly to the 
heart of the issue—is Bryant a threat to others? Was this an isolated incident? Etc.152 Although 
the decision claims that “none of this suggests that an emergency is ongoing in every place or 
even just surrounding the victim for the entire time that the perpetrator of a violent crime is on 
the loose,” the decision’s evidence in support of this is unclear.153 The Court argues that 
interrogations may gradually transform from a response to an emergency to the eliciting of 
testimonial statements. 
This evolution may occur if, for example, a declarant provides police with information 
that makes clear that what appeared to be an emergency is not or is no longer an 
emergency or that what appeared to be a public threat is actually a private dispute. It 
could also occur if a perpetrator is disarmed, surrenders, is apprehended, or, as in Davis, 
flees with little prospect of posing a threat to the public.154 
 
Though this list is likely not all-encompassing, the transformation from a nontestimonial 
interrogation to a testimonial interrogation is contingent on a limited number of factors which 
suggest that an “ongoing emergency” is to be interpreted broadly. Police can either remain 
ignorant to the scope of a situation to extend an emergency and gather statements with a function 
identical to those which would be offered in court, or the emergency could extend as long as a 
potentially armed perpetrator is a potential threat to the public. The Court creates an exception 
with such latitude that conditions can be manipulated into an emergency simply when there are 
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uncertainties about the potential scope of a situation and its danger, and this emergency can be 
extended by remaining ignorant to clarifying facts. This is not the way that the Confrontation 
Clause was intended to function. Consequentially, criminal defendants face a serious injustice in 
court when statements with the function of proving past fact pertinent to a crime are not subject 
to cross-examination but are entered into evidence because they were made during an ongoing 
emergency and construed to have been used to resolve that ongoing emergency. Criminal 
defendants suffer from this functional resurrection of Roberts.155 
Consequences for Evidence-Based Prosecution and the Hierarchy of Public and Private 
Violence 
 The Bryant decision’s framework has an inadvertently adverse effect on the efficacy of 
evidence-based prosecution and thus victims of intimate-partner violence. Consider again the 
Court’s language distinguishing Bryant from Davis. Bryant was “a nondomestic dispute” in 
which the victim was in a “public location” and the potential threat encompassed “responding 
police and the public at large.”156 Later the opinion further distinguishes by noting: 
Davis and Hammon involved domestic violence, a known and identified perpetrator, and, 
in Hammon, a neutralized threat. Because Davis and Hammon were domestic violence 
cases, we focused only on the threat to the victims and assessed the ongoing emergency 
from the perspective of whether there was a continuing threat to them.157 
 
Distinguishing the severity of emergencies based on the relationship of the victim and the 
perpetrator creates a system where intimate-partner violence is viewed as a lower-risk emergency 
than crimes committed by strangers. This diminishes the realities of the severity that intimate-
partner violence can reach and disregards the patterns of re-abuse that accompany so many 
intimate-partner violence cases. Female victims of intimate-partner violence between the ages of 
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18 and 24 were re-abused by the same perpetrator in 77% of cases.158 That statistic jumps to 81% 
of females when the age considered is between 35 and 49.159 If the Court was considering the 
potential continued threat to the victim at hand, then victims of domestic violence may likely be 
facing more of a potential threat than victims of violent crime by strangers or known offenders 
who are not intimately related to the victim. A declarant who is not narrating dangerous events as 
they happen to a law enforcement officer is not necessarily out of danger.160 
The chance of continued danger to the public, the police, and Anthony Covington was 
enough to transform multiple statements made by Covington to police officers in to 
nontestimonial statements. However, the likelihood of re-abuse in cases of intimate-partner 
violence is insufficient to constitute an ongoing emergency. Even Michelle McCottry noted that 
Davis had been “jumpin’ on me again” noting that this was a behavior that had occurred 
before.161 The Court also considered the potential threat to additional members of the public in 
the Bryant case. However, this was not taken in to consideration when assessing the domestic 
violence cases which came before the Court. Intimate-partner violence is not always confined to 
one victim. “A study of intimate partner homicides found 20% of victims were family members 
or friends of the abused partner, neighbors, persons who intervened, law enforcement responders, 
or bystanders.”162 In addition, the threat can often extend to children; between 30 and 60 percent 
of intimate-partner abusers also are abusive toward children in the home.163 Intimate partner 
violence is not confined to one potential victim. Rather, it both threatens the safety of others and 
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often includes re-abuse. Consequentially, the Court’s consideration of whether there was a 
continued potential threat to either Michelle McCottry or Amy Hammon may not have 
considered all the nuances of intimate-partner violence and the special form of emergency which 
it presents. This approach unfairly creates a bias against victims of intimate-partner violence 
because the future potential danger to them is not given the same weight as hypothetical danger 
to police or the greater public as in Bryant. The Court noted that separating Amy and Hershel 
Hammon in to different rooms was enough to end an emergency, yet the separation between 
Covington and his attacker both in location and temporally was apparently insufficient.164 This 
comparison demonstrates a minimization of the complexities and dangers of domestic violence 
and a hierarchy between public and private violence where private violence is a lower tier 
danger. The Court went so far as to say that an evolution from testimonial to nontestimonial may 
happen if “what appeared to be a public threat is actually a private dispute.”165 This language has 
the effect of creating a test where public violent crimes can nearly always be ruled an ongoing 
emergency for the purposes of the Confrontation Clause, while “private disputes” are never 
enough of an emergency to be ruled an ongoing emergency. 
 However, Oregon has implemented a hearsay law which allows for statements made by 
victims of domestic violence within twenty-four hours of an attack to be considered to have been 
made in the course of an ongoing emergency and are admissible as long as they bear sufficient 
indicia of reliability.166 This law is overcorrects in its response to Crawford. Whether no 
domestic dispute, or all domestic disputes are considered ongoing emergencies, the ongoing 
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emergency doctrine on its own is incompatible with a fair application of the Confrontation 
Clause to cases of ongoing abuse, and lower courts have struggled to apply the doctrine fairly.167 
Though not specifically written out, the Bryant decision adds another relational 
requirement to the understanding of the ongoing emergency doctrine. It has the impact of asking 
lower courts to consider the relationship between the alleged perpetrator and the victim, and if 
the victim and the perpetrator are intimately related, then the scope of the emergency is smaller. 
An interesting hypothetical to consider: if Covington had been lying in the same spot at the gas 
station with the same fatal wounds, had been asked the same questions about what happened, 
who shot, and where, but had answered that it was “Rick,” his husband, who had shot him 
through the door of his home about twenty minutes before he had driven to the gas station, would 
the opinion have been the same? The only substantive factual difference in this hypothetical 
would be the relationship between the victim and the shooter. Suddenly, there is “a narrower 
zone of potential victims than cases involving threats to public safety” which undermines a great 
deal of the Court’s argument for Covington’s statements being offered to resolve an ongoing 
emergency.168 The primary purpose test should not place so much weight on the relationship 
between the accused and the victim—this creates drastic differences in the amount of protection 
of confrontation rights between those accused of domestic violence and those accused of public 
violence, and also between victims of public crime and victims of intimate-partner crime. In the 
1980s, a series of equal protection cases surrounding law enforcement’s abysmal response to 
domestic violence emerged in America’s courts. Plaintiffs claimed that law enforcement treating 
victims of domestic violence differently than victims of other violent crime is discriminatory 
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against women, and that police should be aware of this negative impact.169 They further argued 
that there is no “important or compelling public interest” in different treatment.170 The female 
plaintiffs did not win their cases; however, these equal protection cases demonstrate that 
discrepancies between treatment of victims of intimate-partner violence and victims of other 
violent crime by law enforcement and the court system do raise legitimate questions of whether 
an unequal playing field for victims is justified by “important or compelling public interest.”  
 Clearly, the ruling in Davis regarding McCottry’s statements made during the 911 call 
were rendered nontestimonial and thus the bar of ongoing emergency is not a catchall block on 
statements made regarding private disputes, but the Court noted that the question before the 
Court only required them to assess the testimonial nature of McCottry’s first few responses 
during the call. Therefore, they did not assess whether the ongoing emergency did continue after 
Davis left the home, and no outer bound of an ongoing emergency was defined by Davis.171 
However, considering that the phone call established that Davis had no weapons, the police 
could establish that this was a private dispute, and that the police arrived quickly to aid her, if 
Davis were decided after Bryant and followed its rationale, I would anticipate that statements 
after Davis’s departure would likely be testimonial. 
 The hierarchy of emergency which minimizes intimate-partner violence has a major 
adverse effect on evidence-based prosecution. Evidence-based prosecution is a specific tool 
utilized to manage the prosecution of private disputes when the relationship between the victim 
and the perpetrator deters the victim from participating and thus are unavailable. Bryant created a 
major disadvantage for prosecutors attempting to offer an evidence-based prosecution. Evidence-
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based prosecutors likely have statements made by an unavailable witness that have not been 
subject to the opportunity for cross-examination. Therefore, they either need to subject the 
statements to that opportunity or prove that the statements were made for the primary purpose of 
something other than offering facts for a potential prosecution. The ongoing emergency 
exception would be a popular choice for an alternative purpose—however, Bryant makes that 
exception much smaller for domestic violence cases than for public violence, and thus evidence-
based prosecutors must fight an uphill battle harder than prosecutors of public crimes, or hope 
for a judge who is willing to grant a major expansion of Crawford and Davis doctrine. Yet, 
activist judges are not the proper solution, either. 
I argue that the proper solution is a rebalancing of the Sixth Amendment and Crawford 
that does not reprivatize domestic violence, does not over-expand the exceptions to the Sixth 
Amendment, nor infringe upon the rights of the accused. Rather, the solution has two parts. The 
first part is to implement a new test that shrinks the ongoing emergency exception to equalize 
private violence with public violence. The second part is the implementation of community-
based support structures and other policy solutions within jurisdictions. These policies will aid in 
improving the efficacy of prosecuting intimate-partner violence by helping victims gain 
resources necessary to garner their participation and invigorate forfeiture doctrine for evidence-
based prosecutions that must occur because the victim did not participate. My solution would 
settle the ambiguity and uncertainty that first manifested in blurry tests of “indicia of reliability,” 
evolved into ambiguous conceptions of “testimonial,” and now exist as broad ideas of 
“emergency.”172 
Ohio v. Clark Fact Pattern and Implications 
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 In 2015, the Supreme Court handed down another ruling which would shape the 
landscape of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. Ohio v. Clark’s fact pattern tells a story of 
child abuse and answers whether statements made by a three-year-old to his preschool teacher, a 
mandatory reporter, about who was responsible for injuring him were testimonial and hence 
subject to confrontation. A three-year-old boy, whom the court identified as L.P., arrived at 
preschool and one of his teachers noticed that one of his eyes looked bloodshot.173 The teacher 
asked the child “what happened,” and he was first non-responsive, but then told her that he had 
fallen.174 She noticed that L.P. had red marks covering his face and asked the child, “who did 
this?” and “what happened to you?”175 L.P. responded “something like Dee, Dee,” and told his 
teacher that “Dee is big.”176 It was concluded that “Dee” was a reference to Darius Clark, L.P.’s 
mother’s boyfriend who was left to care for L.P. and his younger sister while their mother was 
away.177 L.P.’s teacher, as a mandatory reporter, alerted the proper authorities about suspected 
child abuse. At the end of the school day, Darius Clark arrived at the school to take L.P. home, 
denied that he was to blame for the abuse, and left with L.P.178 The following day, L.P. and his 
younger sister were taken to the hospital by a social worker; a physician found further injuries 
and signs of abuse.179 Consequentially, Clark was indicted for felonious assault, child 
endangerment, and domestic violence.180 Ohio law prevented L.P. from testifying—his young 
age made him incompetent.181 In lieu of L.P.’s live testimony, the prosecution offered L.P.’s 
statements to his teachers at trial under state hearsay law that admitted “reliable hearsay by child 
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abuse victims” considering his statements “bore sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness.”182 
Clark objected to the admission of L.P.’s statements, arguing that they violated his rights to 
Confrontation; the trial court disagreed and Clark appealed his conviction.183 The Supreme Court 
ruled that L.P.’s statements were nontestimonial because the situation was an ongoing 
emergency considering that L.P. faced the potential danger that the he could be released back to 
his abuser at the end of the school day.184Therefore, the primary purpose of the teacher’s 
questioning was to respond to this emergency and protect L.P.185Additionally, the statements 
were nontestimonial because the dialogue “was informal and spontaneous.”186 The conversation 
between L.P. and his teachers occurred in the preschool lunch room, and only occurred because 
the teacher noticed injuries and needed to respond to that emergency.187 Lastly, these statements 
were rendered nontestimonial because L.P.’s young age precluded him from understanding the 
criminal justice system well-enough to have the primary purpose of providing a statement with a 
prosecutorial purpose.188 
 The fact pattern of this case differs from the previous cases which shaped the 
jurisprudence of the Confrontation Clause considering that the statements were not made to 
investigating or responding police officers, but rather to a teacher who was a mandatory reporter. 
A second key difference is that the statements were made by a three-year-old child whose age 
rendered his statements to be regarded quite differently than those of an adult who would better 
comprehend the situation. However, despite these differences which do make comparison to 
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cases of domestic violence difficult, it is important to discuss this case to better understand the 
direction that the Court is taking when determining questions about the Confrontation Clause, 
and question what this direction means for evidence-based prosecution and criminal defendants, 
both.  
 First, this case could be read to extend the ongoing emergency doctrine to include the 
potential for repeat abuse as a component of an ongoing emergency inquiry. If this were the case, 
then evidence-based prosecution of intimate partner violence would be able to go forward with 
far fewer issues than they did in the initial time period post- Crawford. However, as a result, the 
rights of criminal defendants would be severely damaged, and the Confrontation Clause would 
lose strength. Justice Alito, the author of the opinion, wrote: 
[The teachers] rightly became worried that the 3-year-old was the victim of serious 
violence. Because the teachers needed to know whether it was safe to release L.P. to his 
guardian at the end of the day… The teachers’ questions were meant to identify the 
abuser in order to protect the victim from future attacks.189 
 
Although not explicit, these words hint at an expansion of the ongoing emergency doctrine to 
include repeat abuse, and future attacks. Could Maria’s statements referring to past abuse be 
rendered nontestimonial because the 911 operator’s primary purpose in asking whether attacks 
on Maria had happened before was to asses Maria’s safety level and protect her from future 
attacks? One could follow the line of reasoning in Clark and reasonably come to that conclusion. 
However, this would demonstrate a major separation from both Davis and Bryant’s decisions 
which all but excluded the possibility of repeat abuse as a contributor to an ongoing emergency. 
 Clark does, however, mimic Bryant because the rationale behind the decision over-
expands the exceptions to the Confrontation Clause. I would agree with the Court that L.P.’s age 
made him incapable of producing statements with the primary purpose of providing evidence for 
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trial. If he is legally incompetent to testify in court, then he is likely incompetent to produce 
testimony outside of the courtroom. However, this begs the question of whether L.P.’s delicate 
age was a necessary or a sufficient condition to render his statements nontestimonial. If his age 
was necessary to render his statements nontestimonial, then questions posed to older students by 
mandatory reporters could still be testimonial if they have the primary purpose of proving some 
past fact relevant to a future prosecution. However, if L.P.’s age was a sufficient condition, as 
the opinion hints at by stating that “statements by very young children will rarely, if ever, 
implicate the Confrontation Clause,” then it is difficult to discern how much of an effect this 
decision has on Confrontation Clause jurisprudence outside the scope of child declarants.190  
Despite hinting at L.P.’s age being a necessary condition, the opinion further elaborates 
reasons for finding his statements nontestimonial. In Clark, Justice Alito identifies the primary 
purpose of the teachers questions as having been “meant to identify the abuser in order to protect 
the victim from future attacks.”191 This purpose, worded in this way, nearly exactly replicates a 
purpose of offering testimony at trial. At trial, on direct examination, a witness would identify an 
abuser or perpetrator of another crime to aid in sentencing and protect the victim or future 
potential victims from future attacks. This fine line between a nontestimonial primary purpose 
and the purposes of testimony signals trouble for the continuing strength of the Confrontation 
Clause. This path is a slippery slope that begins with determining that statements offered to help 
end an ongoing emergency are nontestimonial and could potentially end with a Confrontation 
Clause exception that encompasses any statement that helps to catch a criminal and fight crime 
by providing facts relevant to that crime disguised as a “primary purpose of ending an ongoing 
emergency.” 
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Resurrecting Roberts 
Ohio v. Roberts was struck down by the Supreme Court because its relationship with the 
Confrontation Clause was unworkable. The case left out-of-court statements to be handled by 
hearsay law instead of the Sixth Amendment and had a nullifying effect on criminal defendants’ 
rights to confrontation. Crawford v. Washington was handed down as the new rule for 
delineating which out-of-court statements were in violation of the Confrontation Clause when 
admitted without an opportunity for cross-examination, and which were not. This case created a 
major roadblock for prosecutors relying on out-of-court statements made by unavailable 
witnesses. Two years following Crawford, the Court readdressed the Confrontation Clause and 
testimonial statements and implemented the primary purpose test which allowed for statements 
made for the purposes of resolving an ongoing emergency to be rendered nontestimonial and 
thus subject to the Rules of Evidence on hearsay instead of to the Confrontation Clause. 
Michigan v. Bryant expanded that rule by naming a situation where a perpetrator was unknown 
in identity, location, and potential for future threat, and a victim was relaying statements while 
suffering from a mortal injury as an ongoing emergency for the sake of the Crawford and Davis 
rulings. Finally, Ohio v. Roberts opened the possibility that ongoing emergency doctrine could 
encompass situations where future abuse to the same victim. This lineage of cases has excluded 
so many statements from being subject to the effects of Crawford and the Confrontation Clause 
that “a suspicious mind (or even one that is merely not naïve) might regard this distortion as the 
first step in an attempt to smuggle longstanding hearsay exceptions back in to the Confrontation 
Clause—in other words, an attempt to return to Ohio v. Roberts.”192 
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 Resurrecting Roberts through the gradual restoration of its vitality through a number of 
Supreme Court cases is not the direction that the Court should be heading. There must be a 
reexamination of the problem that Crawford was initially intended to solve. Crawford sought to 
reinvigorate the strength of the Sixth Amendment right of criminal defendants to confront the 
witnesses against them in all criminal prosecutions. The decision determined that holding a 
sufficient “indicia of reliability” or falling under “deeply rooted hearsay exceptions” were not 
valid reasons to exempt out-of-court statements that served as ex parte evidence from the 
Confrontation Clause as a substitute for live testimony. Considering this, the workings of judicial 
systems fifteen years after the Crawford decision should still have the same effect of excluding 
statements which have not been subject to cross-examinations yet are a “solemn declaration or 
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”193 The over-expanded 
ongoing emergency doctrine has distorted this function and moved Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence to a point where excited utterances are often only subject to the Rules of Evidence 
because the “startling event or condition” that the rule requires to be occurring and causing stress 
and excitement to be felt by the declarant may be construed to be synonymous with “ongoing 
emergency.”194 This virtually returns excited utterances to a point where they are admissible 
around the Confrontation Clause because they are a deeply rooted hearsay exception which bears 
indicia of reliability—the backbone of Roberts. In addition, Crawford’s original function has 
been further distorted by the very text of Ohio v. Clark. A reason which L.P.’s statements are 
rendered nontestimonial by the trial court is because the Ohio Rule of Evidence 807 “allows the 
admission of reliable hearsay by child abuse victims, the court ruled that L.P.’s statements to his 
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teachers bore sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to be admitted as evidence.”195 Admitting 
statements solely because they bear indicia of reliability or guarantees of trustworthiness was the 
exact thing Crawford made unacceptable, yet this rationale was being applied in Ohio trial courts 
in 2013. This logic demonstrates the reality that the ghost of Roberts is haunting the 
effectiveness of Crawford’s impact.  
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Chapter 3: Rectifying the Resurrection of Roberts 
Function Versus Purpose 
 Crawford sought to block the admission of statements that were used in lieu of in-court 
testimony for the same purposes as in-court testimony by requiring that statements of a 
testimonial nature be subject to cross-examination. The right to confrontation is a procedural 
guarantee; Crawford makes this clear.196 This means that the test applied in sorting testimonial 
statements from nontestimonial statements should keep out those with a function identical to the 
function of in-court testimony. Statements made out-of-court during an investigation which 
replicate the function of proving some fact pertinent to a criminal prosecution should be subject 
to cross-examination. The primary purpose test has blurred the lines between purpose and 
function. The Confrontation Clause should have power over out-of-court statements with a 
testimonial function because this is a less subjective test than the primary purpose test. Although 
purpose and function are often understood as synonyms, their definitions distinguish them 
enough to make a major difference when considered from a legal standpoint. According to the 
Merriam Webster dictionary, a “purpose” is “something set up as an object or end to be attained; 
Intention” 197. The MacMillan dictionary defines it as “the goal that someone wants to achieve, 
or that something is intended to achieve.”198 The words intent, wants, and set up, each insinuate 
that purpose is dependent on an actor’s desires and motivations. A primary purpose test thus 
requires courts to evaluate the mindsets of declarants and the police in a subjective manner. This 
is made clear by the aforementioned cases where the primary purposes of the interrogators and 
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declarants are assessed. Under this test alone, two identical “solemn declaration(s) or 
affirmation(s) made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact” against the accused 
may be classified differently from one another as long as the declarant’s primary purpose can be 
assumed to be different things—one statement for the sake of aiding a prosecution and the other 
for the sake of ending an ongoing emergency. Identical statements may have different purposes, 
but the same function. Merriam Webster defines function as “the action for which a person or 
thing is specifically fitted or used or for which a thing exists.”199 This definition is more 
objective—is the action for which the statement is specifically fitted or used an action which 
establishes or proves some fact? Is the statement specifically fitted for a replication of in-court 
testimony? This assessment requires no speculation into mindset, but rather questions only the 
content of the statement. Is the statement the functional equivalent of in-court testimony? Would 
the statement, if said during a direct-examination, be right in place? The Confrontation Clause 
should cover statements that are the functional equivalent of in-court testimony instead of only 
covering statements which have the same purpose of in-court testimony. The oral argument in 
the Crawford case suggests that statements functionally equivalent to in-court testimony should 
be barred.200This better guarantees that the right to confrontation remains a procedural instead of 
a substantive guarantee.  
A New Testimonial Test 
 To cease a resurrection of Roberts and restore order and vigor to the Sixth Amendment in 
all criminal prosecutions, and to even the playing field for victims of intimate-partner violence, I 
would suggest the implementation of a clear, two-part test that replaces the “totality of the 
                                                             
199 Merriam Webster’s Dictionary, s.v. “Function,” accessed March 11, 2019, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/function. 
200 Crawford v. Washington Oral Argument, United States Supreme Court, 10 Nov. 2003. 
64 
 
 
circumstances” system offered in Bryant. This test would not even the playing field by 
expanding the exceptions to the Confrontation Clause for victims of intimate-partner violence to 
match the gaping exception offered to general victims of anonymous violent crime, but rather 
scale back the exceptions to become more equitable. Solutions to the problems faced by 
evidence-based prosecution should not be solved by growing constitutional exceptions nor a 
reincarnation of Roberts, but rather by policy solutions, which will be addressed in this chapter. 
 The two-part test I suggest does include a primary purpose test, but adds a simple, 
objective, second portion to bar statements which would filter through the primary purpose test 
despite their testimonial nature. I propose that first, as precedent suggests, the primary purpose of 
a statement be assessed. Is the primary purpose of the statement, from the point of view of a 
reasonable person in the declarant’s position, to establish facts potentially relevant to a potential 
prosecution or criminal investigation? If yes, then the statement is testimonial and should be 
subject to the Confrontation Clause without any need to consult the second part of the test. This 
falls in line with Davis. If the answer to the primary purpose portion is no, then the court should 
consider whether the function of the statements is to prove or establish a fact about a crime that 
could be used in lieu of live testimony at a future, or potential trial. If yes, then the statements are 
testimonial and should be covered by the Confrontation Clause. If no, then the statement should 
be admitted if state or federal hearsay rules of evidence allow. The scope of this test is limited to 
statements made to law enforcement officers and individiuals actively working as arms of law 
enforcement, like the 911 operator in Davis. The Supreme Court has continually refused to draw 
a line on where testimonial statements fall when statements are made to non-law enforcement 
officers. Ohio v. Clark failed to do so as well because of the added consideration of L.P.’s 
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delicate age. Consequently I, too, will resist to offer a test to determine the testimonial nature of 
statements made to non-law enforcement officers. 
Figure 1: Flowchart for Two-Part Testimonial Test for Statements Made to Law 
Enforcement Officers 
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This new test would allow statements which are clearly not being offered for the purposes 
of creating evidence for use in a future prosecution to be admitted but would make statements 
inadmissible which serve as a functional equivalent of testimony. Sylvia Crawford’s statements, 
those regarding her husband’s assault of a man who allegedly attempted to rape her and given 
during a recorded interrogation at the police station, would still be testimonial—their primary 
purpose was to offer evidence for a prosecution and would not even implicate the second part of 
the test. Michelle McCottry’s statements during her 911 call up to the point where the operator 
says, “Okay, sweetie. I’ve got help started. Stay on the line with me, okay?” would be 
nontestimonial because it is clear that McCottry’s primary purpose was to call for help.201 
Usually, victim initiated statements which call for help hold a primary purpose of seeking help, 
not to incriminate202 The function of her statements prior to that point do not serve the function 
of pointed incrimination of Davis, either. She simply states why she needs help and where she is. 
In this context, these statements have the function of being specifically fitted for providing the 
operator with the proper information to provide start help. “No “witness” goes into court to 
proclaim an emergency and seek help.”203 However, the function of declaring such an emergency 
and seeking help was achieved when the operator told Michelle that help was on the way. 
Following those statements which called for help, McCottry named the assailant, provided a 
narrative of why Davis was at the home, and informed the operator of information such as 
Davis’s birthday.204 These statements serve as the functional equivalent of live testimony by 
establishing facts relevant to a prosecution. They fail the second portion of the test and are 
therefore testimonial. Regarding the statements made by Anthony Covington in Michigan v. 
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Bryant, I agree with Justice Scalia’s dissent that “from Covington’s perspective, his statements 
had little value except to ensure the arrest and eventual prosecution of Richard Bryant. He knew 
the “threatening situation,” (citation omitted) had ended six blocks away and 25 minutes earlier 
when he fled from Bryant’s back porch.”205 I would argue that Covington’s statements would fail 
to pass the first part of the test and are thus testimonial, but the Court majority disagreed. Under 
my test, Covington’s statements would be subject to the second part of the testimonial test and 
would fail and be labelled testimonial. “Covington recounted in detail how a past criminal event 
began and progressed,” and therefore his statements had the functional equivalent of 
testimony.206 The action for which Covington’s statements were specifically fitted was to prove 
facts relevant to a criminal prosecution.207 
This test would drastically minimize the need for convoluted considerations of the scope 
of emergencies. Consider a situation where the scope of an emergency is blurred. There was 
disagreement from both Justice Scalia and my point of view about whether the Michigan v. 
Bryant fact pattern constituted an emergency. Therefore, Bryant would serve as a good example 
for demonstrating how this test minimizes the need for lengthy arguments over what the 
boundaries of an emergency are. If you apply my test from the point of view that the situation 
was an emergency, then the function test is applied, and Covington’s statements are considered 
testimonial because they are particularly suited for in-court testimony. If you say that the Bryant 
situation was not an emergency and the primary purpose was to offer facts for criminal 
investigation and prosecution, then the statements are rendered testimonial.  Both considerations 
about the scope of emergency reach the same result, and consequentially courts would no longer 
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have to spend time defining emergency with multi-factor and unpredictable tests. My test 
resolves this. 
 Though the test I have offered only applies to statements made to law enforcement 
officers and to individuals operating as arms of law enforcement, the test can shed some light on 
the fate of statements made to friends and medical examiners, even if not expressly used. 
Statements made to friends would most always be nontestimonial because their primary purpose 
would not be to prove fact for a potential criminal prosecution, but to confide in a friend or seek 
help from a friend. The statements would pass the first prong of the test and likely pass the 
second because statements made to friends do not function with the same solemnity as 
testimonial statements. Statements made while giving testimony in court function as 
incriminating statements given by a declarant to individuals involved in the criminal justice 
system. Statements made to friends, while they may function as damning statements, do not hold 
the same function of incrimination and are therefore less naturally suited to the function of in-
court testimony. Justice Scalia alludes to this in Crawford with, “An accuser who makes a formal 
statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual 
remark to an acquaintance does not.”208 Statements made during medical examinations would 
most always be nontestimonial because their primary purpose would not be to prove past facts 
for a potential criminal prosecution, but to provide context to an injury in order to seek proper 
treatment. Further, their function differs from testimonial statements. Statements to medical 
examiners are well-fitted within examination rooms where there is privacy and function not as 
incriminating statements to replace testimony—one would talk to a doctor about their injuries 
and conditions different than they would to a judge, jury, and courtroom. However, the narration 
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of how an injury was incurred if a medical examiner was referred to examine a victim by law 
enforcement following a crime could yield a different result. That would render a situation where 
the medical examiner may be operating as an arm of law enforcement and therefore subject to 
the scope of my proposed test. This argument is not intended to parse out that situation.  
The first portion of this test that maintains the primary purpose test should be considered 
from the point of view of the declarant, as perceived by a reasonable person in the declarant’s 
position instead of from the interrogator’s point of view. It is the declarant who would take the 
stand and understand that they are giving testimony when giving statements in a courtroom. In 
the same manner, it should be the declarant whose mindset and primary purpose are considered 
to understand whether the declarant-witness would understand that they, though out of court, are 
acting as a witness. Additionally, cross-examination is required to assess the reliability of the 
mindset of the witness, not the mindset and reliability of the questioning officer. A primary 
purpose test which solely focuses on the motives of the declarant helps the court to understand 
why statements are made, and thus whether they are understood as solemn declarations proving 
some fact.209 Therefore, it is most in line with the Confrontation Clause to assess the testimonial 
nature of a statement of the declarant from the point of view of a reasonable person in their 
shoes. This test should not be subject to the viewpoint flip-flopping previously employed to 
obtain favorable results. In addition, I assess the first question of the test from the point of view 
of a reasonable person in the declarant’s shoes because the reasonable person point of view also 
allows for statements to be considered from a fresh set of eyes. Prior interactions with the 
criminal justice system are common in cases of intimate-partner violence, and these prior 
interactions may cause a person to be more aware that their statements are being used for a 
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prosecutorial purpose and not to resolve an ongoing emergency210 A reasonable person in the 
declarant’s position allows for a neutral, unprejudiced point of view to be considered and makes 
the test less subjective than if the viewpoint of the actual declarant were considered.211 The 
second part of this test ensures that it is not only the intent of a reasonable person that determines 
the testimonial nature of a statement, but guarantees that statements, regardless of intent, are 
encompassed by Sixth Amendment protections. 
 This proposed test shrinks the ongoing emergency doctrine in a manner that levels the 
playing field between victims of violent crime by nondomestic offenders and victims of domestic 
violence. The test would not allow for statements to be rendered nontestimonial only because the 
offender posed a hypothetical threat to the public. Statements made by victims of intimate-
partner violence and by victims of nondomestic crime would be treated in an identical manner 
because the assessment of the function of statements is less manipulable than assessments of the 
purpose of statements. Justice Scalia wrote in his dissent of Bryant that: 
If the dastardly police trick a declarant into giving an incriminating statement against a 
sympathetic defendant, a court can focus on the police’s intent and declare the statement 
testimonial. If the defendant “deserves” to go to jail, then a court can focus on whatever 
perspective is necessary to declare damning hearsay nontestimonial. And when all else 
fails, a court can mix-and-match perspectives to reach its desired outcome.212 
 
The combination of the primary purpose and primary function test strips away the nonsense of 
the “totality of the circumstances” approach. The first prong, primary purpose, can immediately 
stamp statements made with a prosecutorial purpose with a “testimonial” stamp, but the second 
prong, the function test both checks and balances the primary purpose test. It adds an objective 
test to assess statements as statements with or without testimonial function instead of as 
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statements which can be shaped to circumvent or directly violate the Confrontation Clause 
depending on the “fairest” outcome.213 A designation of a purpose to a statement a great deal of 
time after a statement was made welcomes manipulation to make the statement more favorable to 
admissibility.214 In addition, this discretion allows for discrimination against victims. When a 
victim of intimate-partner violence recants or does not fit the bill of what courts and juries expect 
a victim to be, then the victim’s statements may be viewed under a different lens. Female victims 
of intimate-partner violence have argued that discretion and discrimination go hand-in-hand.215 
The difficulties that Crawford posed for prosecutors of evidence-based prosecution is likely to 
affect the way that the courts interpret the Sixth Amendment’s coverage, and having a 
manipulable test encourages this.216 Assessing the function of statements allows for identical 
assertions in different environments to be treated in the same way. For example, if Maria, 
Michelle McCottry, and Anthony Covington all responded to a question asking for a physical 
description of their assailant by answering that their attacker was a Caucasian male, 
approximately six-foot tall and 250 pounds, bald, and wearing a red hoodie, then these identical 
statements would yield the same testimonial result. Even if Maria and Michelle identified this 
person as their husband or boyfriend and Covington identified him as “Rick” the statements 
serve the same function whether the threat extends to one victim, or future potential victims. This 
description does not go to resolving an ongoing emergency and has the function of proving a fact 
relevant to a criminal prosecution. A descriptive statement such as this would be testimonial 
without a subjective assessment of to whom a potential threat extends that has a discriminatory 
effect on victims of intimate-partner violence. 
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The Need for and Application of a New, Two-Part Test 
 The primary purpose test combined with a totality of the circumstances assessment made 
for an unpredictable, manipulable, and often discriminatory system of sorting testimonial 
statements from nontestimonial statements. By the time that Ohio v. Clark was decided by the 
United States Supreme Court in 2015, the exceptions to the Confrontation Clause had become 
over-extended to a point which nearly nullified Crawford and resurrected Roberts. To restore 
strength to the Confrontation Clause and Crawford and create a system which does not violate 
the rights of criminal defendants nor disadvantage prosecutions of intimate-partner violence, a 
new two-part test should be adopted. First, courts should consider the primary purpose of a 
statement from the point of view of the declarant. If the primary purpose of the statement is to 
aid in a prosecution, it is testimonial. If it is not, courts should assess whether the statement has a 
testimonial function. If it does, it is testimonial. Nontestimonial statements are left subject to 
evidentiary rules on hearsay. This test equalizes victims of violent crime and removes the 
hierarchy that delegitimizes intimate-partner crime. However, it is undeniable that this new test 
would not ease the struggles of bringing forward a case by means of evidence-based prosecution 
when victims of intimate-partner violence refuse to participate in the prosecutorial process. 
Chapter Two has demonstrated that the current tests of the admissibility of out-of-court 
statements are unworkable and has presented a solution that does not over-extend exceptions to 
allow for evidence-based prosecution to successfully proceed. The solution to the tension 
between the Confrontation Clause and evidence-based prosecution is in the legislature, not the 
courts. Chapter Four will discuss how community-based support systems, investigative 
standards, and the forfeiture doctrine can help to promote the success of evidence-based 
prosecution without compromising the Confrontation Clause and equip victims with the 
73 
 
 
resources and support they need to be encouraged to take part in prosecution, circumnavigating 
the need for evidence-based prosecution altogether. 
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Chapter Four: Policy Solutions to the Post-Crawford Crisis 
A widened definition of testimonial statements would have negative consequences for 
evidence-based prosecution of intimate-partner violence (IPV). Without victim involvement, 
most statements gathered through 911 calls and initial police interrogations would not be subject 
to cross-examination, and thus, unless the statement were made for a purpose other than to 
produce evidence pertinent to a future trial and did not have a function identical to in-court 
testimony, most statements made by non-cooperative victims would be inadmissible. 
Consequentially, for the prosecution of domestic violence cases to be successful under my 
proposed test, several policy solutions should be implemented within criminal justice 
jurisdictions. These policy solutions would improve the process of managing intimate-partner 
violence cases and hence increase victim willingness to participate in the prosecution, making 
evidence-based prosecution less necessary and conflicts with the Confrontation Clause more 
infrequent. However, no policy solution will be sufficient to allow or encourage every victim of 
intimate-partner violence to be a willing prosecutorial participant, so I will discuss the use of the 
forfeiture doctrine in cases where a victim’s participation cannot be secured. 
The Need for Community Collaboration 
Chapter One discussed several factors which deter victims from participating in 
prosecution. If the obstacles that victims face which prevent them from participating in 
prosecution could be more easily overcome, then victim-survivors could be more willing to 
participate, and the number of evidence-based prosecutions which may have conflicts with the 
Confrontation Clause may decrease.  Victim needs may be best addressed through a criminal 
justice partnership with community organizations that can aid victims in meeting the needs they 
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have outside of the criminal justice system.217 The success rate of intimate-partner violence 
response may be understood in terms of victim satisfaction with the services and aid made 
available to victims by law enforcement including information about restraining orders or 
providing transportation to or information about shelter services rather than simply measured by 
arrest rates.218 Victims of intimate-partner violence cite a lack of information about the criminal 
justice system and about additional services available to them as one of the largest contributing 
factors to their unwillingness to participate in the prosecution process.219 Consequently, a 
criminal justice partnership with community organizations which provide services and a program 
which prioritizes transparency, options, and victim empowerment could improve victim 
satisfaction and encourage court participation.  Studies dating as far back as 1977 demonstrate 
that victim-assistance programs increase victim participation—such programs in LA and Santa 
Barbara helped domestic violence non-cooperation rates to be lower than ten percent. 220 In 
addition, victims are more willing to participate if time is spent counseling the victim about their 
options and their risk.221 Responding police officers are not as well equipped to do this as victim 
advocates specifically trained on intimate-partner violence, and thus a criminal justice pairing 
with community services can best address the nuances of IPV. Critics of community-criminal 
justice conjunctions argue that these partnerships cause intimate-partner violence to become a 
subject of social work instead of treated as the violent crime that it is.222 However, these 
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partnerships do not require the response to intimate-partner violence to be labeled as either 
“social work” or “crime response,” but allow for the unique conditions and complications of IPV 
to be understood and addressed.  The National Crime Victim Survey uncovered that only one out 
of four survey respondents who were victims of domestic violence received services from 
victim-assistance programs; the police are often contacted in lieu of help hotlines.223 Intimate-
partner violence assistance and resource organizations and the criminal justice system each have 
similar goals of protecting victims from violence. This goal could better be achieved if access to 
the criminal justice system and victim-assistance worked in partnership so that a call to the 
police could be a conduit to additional services when necessary.  
The Target Abuser Call Program—An Example of Community Cooperation 
The Chicago Target Abuser Call (TAC) program is an example of such a community-
criminal justice partnership which has increased victim participation in domestic violence cases 
and should serve as a model for intimate-partner violence response programs which jurisdictions 
across the country should adopt. This program is funded through the Violence Against Women 
Act’s  (VAWA) STOP (Services, Training, Officers, Prosecutors) grant224 and additional grant 
money from the United States Department of Justice.225 The program utilizes a vertical 
prosecution program which employs prosecutors who are specifically trained for TAC 
prosecution and partners this domestic violence court with TAC investigators, independent 
domestic violence advocates, victim-witness specialists, connecting victims with civil attorneys 
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when appropriate.226 Cases are labeled as high-risk based on evaluations of prior criminal 
domestic violence history, the severity of injury, presence of weapons or threats of their use, and 
evidence of prior threats to kill or harm the victim or his/her family.227 Once a case has been 
“screened in” to the TAC program, an investigative team contacts the victim, calculates her level 
of safety, collects evidence and photos, inquires about additional witnesses, and provides the 
victim with both a subpoena and written materials about the criminal and civil legal systems, as 
well as the TAC program which she will be involved with.228 Next, a victim-witness specialist 
places a call to the victim to respond to any questions she may have regarding her options and 
the materials she was provided by investigators.229 When the victim arrives on the initial court 
date, this specialist will cover court procedure, speak to the victim about her goals for the 
process, and aid the victim in filling out an order of protection, if the victim wishes.230 In 
addition, on the first court date, each member of the TAC team, from the prosecutor to the 
independent advocate, will speak to the victim about the role they play and the support they can 
provide.231 The independent advocate (from the Chicago Hull House) confidentially interviews 
the victim to speak about her concerns and address needs regarding housing or shelter, her job, 
her children, or counseling through referrals and making contacts.232 TAC advocates made 
referrals in 84% of cases—this is a jump of 50 percentage points in comparison to the number of 
service referrals made to victims participating with the general domestic violence court.233 
Studies show that greater amounts of tangible support and resources such as childcare, 
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transportation, and economic resources aid in increasing the chances that a victim will be 
involved in the prosecutorial process.234 Referrals made by the TAC advocates help to give 
victims access to these tangible support sources. In addition to receiving support from advocates, 
a TAC attorney on the civil side of the law will meet with the victim if she desires or needs 
services pertaining to child custody or civil orders of protection.235 Finally, the criminal 
prosecutor will speak to the victim about her options for criminal legal remedy, conduct further 
investigation, and prepare the victim for trial.236Because the TAC program employs a vertical 
approach to prosecution, this attorney will be involved in the victim’s case at every stage and 
will subsequently possess greater knowledge about the facts and details regarding each 
individual case; this continued support and stability builds trust between the victim and the legal 
system.237 Each of the members of this TAC team is then included in regular team consultations 
where the desires and needs of the victim are prioritized.238 
These procedures were specifically implemented to address some of the primary reasons 
that victim-survivors cite for their disinclination to engage with the criminal justice system. 
Interviews with victim-survivors of intimate-partner violence show that the confusing criminal 
justice process and lack of clarity regarding the differences between the civil and criminal 
systems deterred participation, and that victims received insufficient follow-up and contact from 
the court system which distorted their understanding of the role they were to play.239 The 
continuity of contact between the victim and members of the TAC team allows for confusion to 
be decreased while familiarity with the system to be increased. TAC women reported that the 
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involvement of supporters in the TAC system alleviated many of their fears, helped them 
become more familiar with the criminal justice system and process, and encouraged them to 
continue their involvement in the prosecutorial process.240 These women reported that the TAC 
relationships increased their commitment to the prosecution and this commitment was 
empowering.241 In short, the more that the concerns about a lack of information and clarity were 
addressed by the TAC team, the more satisfied women were with the prosecutorial process and 
the more enthusiastic they were to participate.242 
The satisfaction levels of victim-survivors who were screened in to the TAC program 
were compared with those of victim-survivors whose cases were addressed in the general 
domestic violence court. Overall, TAC participants were more satisfied with the contacts they 
had with those involved in the process than the victims who were involved with the general 
court.243 The highest satisfaction levels reported by TAC participants were with the court 
advocate and with the victim-witness specialist.244 The TAC women expressed that their 
questions were better answered, that they believed the TAC team prioritized their needs and 
desires, and that they felt they had control within the process; all of these response rates were 
more positive than those of the victims in the general court.245 In addition, many more TAC 
participants than general court participants reported that they were inclined to come to court 
because they believed that they would be protected; this is likely attributed to the greater amount 
of support and resources they received prior to the court date.246 More than 75% of responding 
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participants reported that their participation in the TAC program decreased the amount of abuse 
they experienced.247  
The TAC program allows for the victims with the highest need to have easier access to 
services and support so that they can better make informed decisions based on the safety of 
themselves and their families with less concern for tangible, material needs. TAC would help 
guarantee that victims at the highest risk be provided with the services they need to empower and 
support them in the criminal justice system and in life in general. When requests for support 
services for victims of IPV go unmet, 60% of victims will return to their abuser while 27% 
become homeless.248 A community TAC program would put high-risk victims in constant 
contact with advocates who can prioritize and address the needs of victims at high-risk and 
encourage them to engage with the criminal justice system. 
The TAC program is not only successful in increasing communication, transparency, and 
access to resources. The program boasts a 90% conviction rate of offenders, with victims 
appearing in court 75% of the time—this is in comparison to a 20-30% conviction rate and a 
25% appearance rate in general domestic violence courts.249 A victim appearance rate in three-
quarters of TAC cases is striking and demonstrates that increased efforts to facilitate 
participation, fulfill the needs of victims outside of the court system, and clarify the process 
make a difference in attrition rates.250 Greater attrition rates translate to fewer Confrontation 
Clause conflicts. 
The use of a TAC program in every case of intimate-partner violence is unfortunately 
impractical considering the additional time these cases require and the insufficient availability of 
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funds and resources to support such a large need. However, this problem can best be minimized 
by screening into TAC the victims with the greatest chances of re-abuse or intimate-partner 
homicide and incorporating the vertical prosecution structure into the model used for all other 
IPV cases. Cases should be screened in to TAC utilizing the ODARA (Ontario Domestic Assault 
Risk Assessment) test. This test can be quickly administered by responding officers on the scene 
of an intimate-partner assault. The questionnaire includes thirteen “yes” or “no” questions; every 
question answered with a “yes” receives a score of 1 and “no” receives a zero.251 When the 
questionnaire is complete, the total score is tallied and is compared to a table which predicts the 
recidivism rate of cases with such scores.252 For example, scoring a 5 on the ODARA scale 
would signal a 53% chance of recidivism while a score of 7 or higher suggests a 73% recidivism 
rate.253 An analysis of the ODARA test and similar IPV recidivism prediction tests revealed that 
the ODARA was most accurate at predicting future violence; it correctly distinguished recidivists 
from nonrecidivists nearly 70% of the time.254 The questionnaire was developed through careful 
analysis of criminal justice databases of IPV and utilized the same database to measure re-assault 
and common factors within those cases.255 This test asks questions which address the strongest 
indicators of re-assault including whether the victim had been confined or restrained from 
escape, whether the assailant had ever threatened to harm or kill the victim or her family, 
whether the victim is worried about future assault, whether the victim and assailant have children 
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together (2 children or more scores a 1), whether the victim has a child with someone other than 
the assailant, whether the victim has ever been assaulted during a pregnancy, whether the 
perpetrator abuses substances, whether the victim faces barriers to support including lack of 
transportation or childcare responsibilities, whether the perpetrator is violent to non-domestic 
individuals, whether the perpetrator has prior records of domestic or non-domestic assault in 
police reports or on criminal records, whether the assailant has been previously sentenced to 
custodial time for more than thirty days, and whether the assailant has ever violated a conditional 
release.256 Other risk assessments include questions regarding the presence of or access to 
weapons and whether the assailant had ever used or threatened to use such weapons.257 In 
addition, more recent studies have suggested replacing the question pertaining to abuse while 
pregnant with a question that asks whether the assailant had ever tried or succeeded in strangling 
the victim to increase accuracy and sort nonrecidivists from recidivists.258 
Responding officers should complete the ODARA form with victims during their 
response to the scene, and if the total score is 5 or above, the victim should be included in a TAC 
program when resources allow. Approximately 20% of cases result in a score of 5 or above; 
when resources do not allow for this number of cases to utilize the TAC system, priority should 
be given to cases which score 7 or above which make up approximately 6% of IPV cases.259 This 
test will aid responding officers in assessing the current and future severity of the situation so 
that the most tumultuous of situations can receive a proper response and the situations which are 
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unlikely to escalate into future abuse can be addressed in a manner which will not aggressively 
disrupt the lives of those involved with the full force of the criminal justice system.260 In all cases 
which are not screened in to TAC, a vertical prosecution style should be used to promote 
continuity and trust between the victim and prosecutor, and a victim witness specialist should 
meet with the victim on her court date. Chicago TAC implemented this structure to manage TAC 
overflow.261 In addition, all victim-survivors whose ODARA scores suggest that they are at a 
higher risk for future violence, a 4 or above, should be provided an opportunity to call an 
advocate when police respond to an incident to be notified about safety planning information and 
options and receive information about her specific risk factors.262 Employing a vertical 
prosecution system and providing opportunities to connect with prosecutors, victim-witness 
specialists, and advocates mimics the strengths of the TAC program without requiring the 
extensive use of resources. The use of ODARA to sort cases in and out of the TAC program 
allows for cases with high probability of recidivism to be addressed by the prosecutorial system 
with the greatest fervor and for cases with fewer indications of severity and chance for recurring 
abuse to be managed in a way which supports the victim but is realistic in terms of resources.  
Prior Opportunities for Cross-Examination 
Criminal justice jurisdictions could further circumnavigate Crawford and Confrontation 
Clause issues through policy measures by providing more avenues for prior opportunities for 
cross-examinations of witnesses. Cross-examined statements are admissible regardless of 
whether the declarant is cooperating at the time of trial. Therefore, testimony given during 
pretrial hearings subject to cross-examination and depositions taken with an opportunity for 
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cross-examination could be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Crawford and the Sixth 
Amendment for the statements contained within the pretrial transcript or deposition. Many states 
have held that opportunities for cross-examination at probable cause or preliminary hearings are 
acceptable for the purposes of Crawford; the Supreme Court of Colorado, however, has held that 
probable cause hearings are not sufficient.263 
States including Arizona and Utah have adopted non-waivable preliminary hearings to 
allow for an early opportunity for cross-examination.264 In Oregon, a bill is pending which would 
allow for the prosecution to call for a hearing to cross-examine a victim if the prosecution is 
concerned about the victim making herself unavailable.265The greater the amount of time 
between a criminal-abuse incident and the subsequent trial, the greater the chances are that a 
victim decides to recant or quit cooperating with prosecutors.266 Earlier opportunities for cross-
examination  can diminish the probability of running into a Confrontation Clause issue, minimize 
the opportunity for witnesses to be threatened or coerced by batterers, and reduce the need for 
victims to be subpoenaed and subsequently held until required to give testimony.267  
In an article titled Domestic Violence and the Confrontation Clause: The Case for a 
Prompt Post-Arrest Confrontation Hearing, author Robert Hardaway suggests that immediately 
following an arrest for intimate-partner abuse, both the alleged assailant and the victim should be 
taken to a specialized courtroom where an immediate cross-examination hearing would be 
held.268 A magistrate on-call would preside while a defense-attorney on-call would represent the 
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accused.269 The prosecutor’s office would be notified, the defendant would be interviewed, and 
the victim would appear, make a sworn statement, and be subject to open-ended cross-
examination.270 The implementation of such a policy would require a great deal of resources, 
time, and commitment; however, it would be a speedy solution to potential Confrontation Clause 
conflicts.  
Finally, though some states do not allow for victim-witnesses to be deposed during the 
pretrial period in criminal cases, studies have shown that victims of intimate-partner violence 
find the deposition process to cause less trauma than testifying live.271 The deposition process 
allows for breaks when necessary and allows for the deponent to be exposed to cross-
examination without the pomp-and-circumstance of trial.272 Though depositions should not be 
exclusively used in lieu of live testimony, the process could be a means of including the victim’s 
story in trial, even when they become unavailable, without violating the Confrontation Clause.   
Investigative Procedures of Intimate-Partner Violence 
In cases where, despite increased support from the community and the justice system, the 
victim chooses not to participate, the problems facing evidence-based prosecution can be further 
improved upon by the adoption of further procedural tactics for law-enforcement officers to use. 
Investigations of intimate-partner abuse should be thorough enough to best allow a prosecutor to 
go forward with an evidence-based prosecution without the victim. Arkansas adopted a law 
(Arkansas Law Section 12-12-108) which requires that investigative law-enforcement agencies 
investigate in a manner that would allow a prosecutor with probable cause to obtain a guilty 
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verdict despite a lack of victim testimony.273 To do so, investigators should properly collect 
statements from victims, witnesses, and the offender, obtain medical records, take photos and 
collect physical evidence from the scene.274 This can be expanded upon utilizing an example 
from Maricopa County, Arizona. The county attorney’s office worked with healthcare forensic 
nurse examiners and law enforcement to give victims of intimate-partner violence 
comprehensive medical forensic exams; these exams utilized high-definition photos and DNA 
collection which helped provide striking evidence of abuse even when victims did not participate 
in prosecution.275 These medical exams made strangulation cases easier to prove and helped to 
raise the rate of successful prosecution for strangulation in the county from just 14% to 61.5%.276 
These specialized medical examinations, made possible by community partnerships, ensure that 
specific signs of abuse are recognized and documented. A study published in the Journal of the 
American Medical Association uncovered that doctors often fail to recognize signs of abuse in 
middle-class patients because of difficulties recognizing abuse and violent behavior in those who 
have similar identities or social positions to themselves.277 Partnerships which promote more 
specialized and specific examinations ensure that more thorough and specific evidence of 
intimate-partner violence is collected. Cases which can be built upon physical evidence instead 
of victim testimony will have fewer Confrontation Clause issues. 
A stronger focus on collecting evidence in a thorough manner could greatly improve the 
success of intimate-partner violence prosecution. A study of police in Rhode Island uncovered 
that police collected physical evidence in fewer than 10% of intimate-partner abuse cases and 
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conducted interviews with further witnesses in fewer than 25% of cases.278 A study of police in 
Ohio revealed that prosecutors were provided with tapes of 911 calls, medical records, and 
testimony from eyewitnesses in less than 10% of cases, and prosecutors in North Carolina only 
received photos of injuries to victims in approximately 15% of cases.279 This shocking lack of 
information given to prosecutors is not a result of a lack of physical evidence or additional 
witnesses, but a lack of continuity in the criminal justice system. A study of IPV cases in large 
urban areas showed that third-parties witnessed or were aware of incidents in approximately half 
of the cases, physical evidence was available in 68%, and victim statements were taken and 
preserved in over half of the cases.280  This demonstrates that in a great deal of cases more 
evidence is available, but simply needs to be collected thoroughly and passed along. The 
statewide adoption of laws similar to Arkansas Law Section 12-12-108 would improve the 
process of evidence collection and criminal justice continuity. 
Misdemeanor simple assault cases will reap the fewest benefits from procedures which 
promote and facilitate the collection of physical evidence and proof of harm to a victim. 
Misdemeanor cases often have less physical evidence than more severe instances of intimate-
partner violence.281 Without observable injury in simple assault cases, there is little left to 
photograph or physically show to prove a case beyond a reasonable doubt.282 Even so, greater 
investigatory thoroughness would have a positive impact on many intimate-partner abuse cases 
and allow for a greater number of cases to be tried successfully when the victim chooses not to 
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cooperate and the prosecutor faces Confrontation Clause obstacles to trying a case with out-of-
court statements. 
Implementing Giles v. California 
 In 2008, the United States Supreme Court handed down a decision in the case Giles v. 
California. In this case, the petitioner, Dwayne Giles, had been convicted of murder after 
shooting his ex-girlfriend, Brenda Avie.283 The prosecution offered statements made weeks 
earlier by the victim to the police when the police responded to a domestic violence call.284 Avie 
described to the officers how she and Giles had been involved in a fight. She had been lifted 
from the ground and choked, punched, and threatened with a knife.285 She further told the 
officers that Giles had made threats to kill her if she was discovered to be cheating on him.286 
These statements were admitted under a California hearsay exception for “statements describing 
the infliction or threat of physical injury on a declarant when the declarant is unavailable to 
testify at trial and the prior statements are deemed trustworthy.”287 The prosecution offered these 
statements at trial to prove that Giles had forfeited his rights to confront these statements (but not 
his rights to object to them on hearsay grounds) because, by murdering the declarant, he had 
secured the unavailability of the witness.288 The Supreme Court reviewed the question of 
“whether a defendant forfeits his Sixth Amendment rights to confront a witness against him 
when a judge determines that a wrongful act by the defendant made the witness unavailable to 
testify at trial.”289 Ultimately, the majority opinion authored by Justice Scalia concluded that the 
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forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was in use at 
the time of the founding and therefore a legitimate exception, but it was only applicable when the 
actions by the defendant were designed to make the witness unavailable to testify against the 
defendant.290 The opinion ultimately concluded that Giles’ actions were not taken to procure 
Avie’s unavailability for his murder trial, so the forfeiture doctrine did not apply in the Giles 
case but is a valid consideration for many cases, including intimate-partner violence cases. The 
opinion concluded with a caveat for the domestic-violence context: 
Acts of domestic violence often are intended to dissuade a victim from resorting to 
outside help, and include conduct designed to prevent testimony to police officers or 
cooperation in criminal prosecutions. Where such an abusive relationship culminates in 
murder, the evidence may support a finding that the crime expressed the intent to isolate 
the victim and to stop her from reporting abuse to the authorities or cooperating with a 
criminal prosecution—rendering her prior statements admissible under the forfeiture 
doctrine. Earlier abuse, or threats of abuse, intended to dissuade the victim from resorting 
to outside help would be highly relevant to this inquiry, as would evidence of ongoing 
criminal proceedings at which the victim would have been expected to testify.291 
 
This paragraph signals that the forfeiture doctrine is an exceptionally important tool for 
promoting the success of evidence-based prosecution. Intimate-partner violence situations give 
criminal defendants a special relationship with their victim-witness which can make coercive 
behavior and threats of violence to deter the victim from testifying especially persuasive. 
 All fifty states have adopted some form codification of the forfeiture by wrongdoing 
doctrine into state rules of evidence. The Federal Rules of Evidence include a forfeiture 
provision under Rule 804(b)(6). The rule allows that any “statement offered against a party that 
wrongfully caused—or acquiesced in wrongfully causing—the declarant’s unavailability as a 
witness, and did so intending that result” be admitted as evidence.292 Of course, this is only 
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applicable if a judge has first determined that the defendant had taken specific actions designed 
to ensure the unavailability of the victim-witness and had therefore forfeited Confrontation 
Clause objections to the admittance of statements by that witness. This hearsay rule is positive 
considering that the shift from a Roberts framework to a Crawford framework made threats to 
the victim which resulted in victim noncooperation beneficial and worthwhile for the 
defendant.293 Under Roberts, the defendant could still be convicted using out-of -court 
statements, while under Crawford, without a codified forfeiture exception, securing the victim’s 
unavailability could secure a dropped case. A Crawford framework coupled with a codified 
forfeiture doctrine allows for the right to Confrontation to be better protected than it was when 
Roberts was the law of the land but ensures that criminal defendants do not benefit from securing 
the unavailability of victim-witnesses through threats, coercion, or bribes. 
 A successful case proving forfeiture by wrongdoing could be one of the most effective 
means of securing a conviction in evidence-based prosecution. If it can be proven that the 
defendant purposefully took actions to dissuade the victim-witness from being available for live 
testimony, then unconfronted statements made by the unavailable victim-witness could be used 
in trial to build a successful intimate-partner violence case. First, forfeiture is primarily a 
preliminary issue determined by a judge prior to trial.294 Consequently, the judge can determine 
forfeiture by hearing statements which would otherwise be inadmissible without forfeiture 
having been confirmed.295 Because forfeiture is a preliminary matter, it should be proven to a 
judge at a pretrial hearing when otherwise inadmissible evidence can be utilized under rule 
104(a) in the Federal Rules of Evidence. This rule requires that “the court must decide any 
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preliminary question about whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is 
admissible. In so deciding, the court is not bound by evidence rules, except those on 
privilege.”296 This means that the judge can hear evidence such as jailhouse calls and 911 calls 
which are hearsay to determine forfeiture. If this otherwise inadmissible evidence proves a 
forfeiture case, then the same evidence will be subject to rules of evidence. For example, if a 911 
call is used to prove forfeiture to a judge then the same phone call could still be rendered 
inadmissible if does not meet the specific requirement of the forfeiture hearsay exception, 
namely it is a testimonial statement but not necessarily a statement against the defendant. 
Statements like this would only be admissible if they met the requirements of another hearsay 
exception. The judge would also have the authority to make statements inadmissible under rule 
403 of the Rules of Evidence if the statement is rendered to be more prejudicial than it is 
probative.297 Even if the judge examines evidence for a forfeiture ruling and believes it credible 
for a ruling affirmative of forfeiture, the judge may still render it inadmissible for trial under 
another evidentiary rule. An affirmative forfeiture ruling would not make all evidence 
immediately admissible, but it removes the Confrontation Clause obstacle, so evidence is only 
subject to the Rules of Evidence. If this evidence does not prove forfeiture, then the testimonial 
evidence is inadmissible if the declarant is unavailable. The procedure for determining forfeiture 
does not employ circular reasoning because first, a judge determines the preliminary matter of 
forfeiture while a jury determines guilt. Second, the standard of proof for a preliminary matter on 
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forfeiture, a preponderance of the evidence, is lower than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
standard of proof for guilt.   
Despite Giles being a lethal case, forfeiture is not limited to lethal cases. The Supreme 
Court said that forfeiture applies when “the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent 
the witness from testifying.”298 This conduct is not limited to murder and is in fact “need not 
consist of a criminal act.”299 Considering this, the expanse of forfeiture extends over non-lethal 
domestic violence cases when it can be proved by a preponderance of the evidence—a standard 
much lower than that for criminal convictions—that the defendant engaged in wrongdoing, 
criminal or not, which caused the declarant-witness to become unavailable for trial.300 Courts 
have historically held that forfeiture applies even when the misconduct is not murder or the 
acquisition of one’s murder in cases like United States v. Aguiar, United States v. Potamitis, and 
numerous others.301 Giles only specifically addressed situations where actions culminate in 
murder, but did not close the door on forfeiture for non-lethal cases and the Rules of Evidence 
make clear that murder is not a prerequisite for forfeiture. 
 Regardless of whether the case of intimate-partner violence is lethal, there are numerous 
sources of evidence and procedures which can be used to build a strong case of forfeiture. Calls 
from jail with statements made by the victim-witness, which unless forfeiture is proven, could be 
ruled inadmissible at trial could be played to the judge to prove that the defendant was coercive 
and made threats to the victim-witness and also show the reaction of the victim-witness to these 
tactics. Seventy-five percent of the time, victim-witness women cease to be cooperative after 
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speaking with the abusive defendant in intimate-partner violence cases.302 One survey 
demonstrated that ninety percent of jurisdictions which were surveyed released a majority of the 
defendants in domestic violence cases while awaiting trial, which gives defendants a larger 
opportunity to contact and dissuade the victim-witness from cooperating.303 A study from 
Milwaukee discovered that more than half of defendants in intimate-partner violence cases 
contacted their victims prior to the trial date and made efforts to convince the victim to recant, 
change their story, or cease cooperation.304 Evidence of these such conversations or actions 
should be sought after and used to prove forfeiture. This requires support of, and contact with, 
the victim-witness for as long as possible. 
Responding police officers could ask questions which would supplement a forfeiture 
claim. Questions about whether the accused had ever threatened the witness if she called the 
police or cooperated with authorities should be asked.305  Further, questions such as, “How 
frequently and seriously does your partner intimidate you?”  “Have you ever made it known to 
your partner that you wanted to leave?” and “If so, how did your partner react?” would help to 
draw out a narrative about intimidation and threatening responses that plant fear in the victim-
witness.306 Written evidence such as texts, posts on social media, and voicemail recordings could 
also potentially be used to show a pattern of manipulation or isolation.307  Any evidence 
preemptively gathered to demonstrate trauma and fear experienced by the victim that could 
potentially later be connected to actions taken by the defendant with, among other motivations, a 
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motivation to prevent the victim from testifying against the defendant would be relevant to a case 
of forfeiture. This type of evidence should be collected and could be used to secure a ruling of 
forfeiture by wrongdoing and serve to aid in successful evidence-based prosecution. 
Corroborating evidence helps to paint a bigger picture of abuse which can protect both victims 
and criminal defendants. For example, corroborating evidence collected by investigators helps to 
build a stronger case for forfeiture and allows for a story to be told about the infliction of trauma 
and the buildup of fear within a victim which are relevant to questions of forfeiture to aid in 
prosecution. Additionally, corroborating evidence helps to mitigate fears of false-positives in 
intimate-partner violence cases. This evidence in conjunction with testimonial accusations of 
harm and abuse helps shed light on the reliability of such accusations. Forfeiture is an important 
determination with the power to suspend the rights of the accused. Therefore, it is imperative that 
forfeiture cases not be built solely upon accusations that could be false-positives. Investigators 
need to make every effort to secure corroborating evidence, and the cases that prosecutors make 
for forfeiture should be robust enough to best mitigate the chance for false positives. The 
solution to concerns about falsely positive accusations should not be a suspension of the use of 
forfeiture, but rather a respect for the integrity and importance of forfeiture. Judges making 
determinations about forfeiture should consider and weigh the evidence and ensure that if there is 
a preponderance of evidence suggesting that the defendant has forfeited their rights, that there is 
sufficient evidence suggesting that the ruling is not based upon a false positive. Corroborating 
evidence supplied through thorough investigation is therefore imperative. 
 In a case from New York, People v. Byrd, prosecutors had proven forfeiture by 
wrongdoing at an evidentiary hearing using expert testimony to describe non-violent actions 
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characteristic of abuse as they relate to Battered Women’s Syndrome.308 The expert witness 
testimony proved that the victim suffered from the trauma of Battered Women’s Syndrome.309  
The expert witness further elaborated on the effects of the “honeymoon” stage of abuse where 
apologies and promises made through calls and visits can be made for the purpose of convincing 
the victim to not cooperate with prosecutors.310 Forfeiture was proven in the Byrd case. The 
timeline of such actions is important because the phone calls and visits in Byrd were made after 
charges for abuse had been made so the promises and actions within the honeymoon phase were 
designed with the specific intent to persuade the victim’s unavailability in a different sense than 
had the “honeymoon” phase taken place absent of criminal charges.311 Battered Women’s 
Syndrome and past experiences of coercion and control are only sufficient to prove that the 
defendant may have engaged in wrongful acts which caused trauma. The additional component 
of specific acts taken designed to procure unavailability for trial would be necessary following 
police intervention and charges. Past evidence is therefore a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition for forfeiture. In this way, less serious efforts to intimidate victims, alone, would be 
insufficient to suspend confrontation rules, but these efforts, when criminal charges are pending 
or on the table, coupled with additional evidence would be enough for a forfeiture ruling. 
Consequently, forfeiture is possible without specific threats of murder, but proving forfeiture can 
be an uphill battle dependent on temporal considerations of when specific threats and coercive 
“honeymoon” behaviors are employed by the defendant.  
The forfeiture doctrine would be inapplicable when the victim-witness refuses to testify 
for reasons not resulting from specifically designed deterrent conduct by the defendant. The 
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forfeiture doctrine would not cover cases where victims become non-cooperative due to a desire 
to drop the case because of financial concerns, concerns for children, or other legitimate reasons 
separate from the defendant’s wrongdoing. Proving wrongdoing requires continuity and temporal 
proof of wrongful action by the defendant specifically designed to secure the unavailability of 
the witness. Therefore, if a victim-witness decides to drop the case and there is no evidence or 
suggestion that wrongful actions were taken by the defendant in response to criminal justice 
intervention, then the case for forfeiture would be lacking the intent requirement made clear in 
Giles. Actions and intent must be proved to a judge by a preponderance of the evidence. In cases 
where victim non-cooperation is the result of a factor other than wrongdoing intended to secure 
unavailability, there will likely be too little evidence of such action and intent to constitute a 
preponderance. In cases such as this, the criminal justice system may not be the proper avenue 
for help at that particular time, and referrals for services and support from community support 
systems may be more beneficial than a life-disrupting prosecution process. 
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Chapter Five: Summary and Conclusions 
 The relationship between intimate-partners who experience violence is complicated, and 
consequently the history and practice surrounding the prosecution of such cases of violence is 
complicated. For many years, Ohio v. Roberts dictated the procedure for prosecuting cases, 
including IPV cases, in which victims or other witnesses were unavailable. Under this 
framework, statements made by unavailable witnesses were being admitted without cross-
examination regardless of their testimonial nature and despite the confrontation guarantee 
afforded by the Constitution’s Sixth Amendment. In 2004, Crawford v. Washington was handed 
down by the United States Supreme Court and mandated that testimonial hearsay statements are 
inadmissible when the witness is unavailable for trial and there is no opportunity for the 
statements to be subject to the procedural guarantee of cross-examination. This decision initially 
served as a major barrier for prosecutors working with evidence-based prosecution of intimate-
partner violence. However, subsequent Supreme Court decisions including Davis v. Washington 
and Michigan v. Bryant have weakened the effects of Crawford and done so in a way which 
dichotomizes “public” and “private” violence and places public violence on a heightened level of 
urgency and concern. Under the present system, Roberts has been figuratively resurrected, the 
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation does not operate with full force, and victims of intimate-
partner violence and evidence-based prosecution of IPV are subject to different treatment than 
the victims and prosecution of public crimes. In order to restore the vigor of the Sixth 
Amendment, rectify the resurrection of Roberts, and create a fair path forward for IPV victims 
and evidence-based prosecution, a new two-part testimonial test which assesses the purpose and 
function of statements should be adopted in courts, and policy initiatives should be adopted to 
aid and protect IPV victims. Steps must be taken at every level to ensure that both the rights of 
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the accused and the rights of victims to be heard and be safe are protected. The adoption of 
programs, such as TAC and vertical prosecution, would help to promote victim involvement and 
their voice while minimizing Sixth Amendment issues. Further, jurisdictions should make efforts 
to facilitate early opportunities for cross-examination of victim-witnesses.  Where, still, the 
availability of victim-witnesses cannot be secured nor prior cross-examination opportunities be 
managed, evidence-based prosecution should robustly go forward when the safety of victims and 
society is dependent on prosecution. In order to do so without overwhelming Sixth Amendment 
obstacles, law enforcement investigators should be required to collect physical and spoken 
evidence in such a way that would best support an evidence-based prosecution. Finally, evidence 
should be collected and used to prove forfeiture by wrongdoing pursuant to the Supreme Court’s 
2008 ruling in Giles v. California. In doing so, criminal defendants cannot perpetuate the cycle 
of abuse by benefiting from coercing, threatening, or further harming victim-witnesses. 
 The story of confrontation clause jurisprudence from Roberts to present is one of a tug-
of-war between a strengthened Sixth Amendment and strengthened prosecutions. While Roberts 
ruled, unavailable witnesses were not detrimental to a successful prosecution. While Crawford 
controlled the courts, prosecutors with hearsay statements made by unavailable witnesses 
struggled to move forward with prosecution, and in response Davis, Bryant, and Clark gradually 
dulled the force of Crawford and returned to a system which resembles the Roberts, diminished 
Sixth Amendment, framework. I proposed a new two-part test to pull the rope back toward the 
center between the Sixth Amendment and strengthened prosecution. However, the solution to the 
confrontation clause conflict does not fall solely to the judicial system. Rather, the solution is a 
marriage of public policy and law. My proposed two-part testimonial test would settle the 
testimonial issue for the courts and the implementation of public policy initiatives would settle 
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further difficulties for evidence-based prosecution and best support victims of intimate-partner 
violence. The resurrection of Roberts can be rectified, but doing so requires a healthy, intimate 
relationship between public policy and law. 
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